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Abstract
This dissertation summarizes my work on how corporations adjust to both policy
driven and random shocks.
In the ﬁrst chapter I document how corporate investment reacts to immigration. I
use an interaction of ex ante clusters of immigrants and a change in immigration policy
in the United Kingdom to provide evidence that the amount of investment increases in
anticipation of immigration ﬂows. The variation introduced by the immigration policy
allows me to control for local economic shocks. Part of the increase in investment occurs
through a transitory increase in ﬁxed assets. The major change occurs in the extensive
margin, through an increase in ﬁrm creation. The increase is larger for the knowledge and
the service sectors, suggesting that human capital is an important driver of the eﬀect. The
results indicate that ﬁrms might quickly react to an immigration-induced labor supply
shock.
In the second chapter, Bernardo Ricca, Jose Morales and I explore the unintended
consequence of the Mexican drug war. Using a similar strategy to Dell (2015), we show
that close elections in which PAN (the party that implemented the war) cause a signiﬁcant
decrease in export growth. We also provide evidence that worker displacement is an
important channel for the eﬀect.
In the third chapter I answer whether managerial experience explain investment to
cash sensitivity. Using a unique, innovative hand-constructed database, this study esti-
mates the sensitivity of investment to cash for European football managers with diﬀerent
experience. To avoid endogeneity issues, I exploit random cash awards to clubs. I esti-
mate these random awards using ex-ante odds of matches. When odds are close, cash
awards can be considered as good as randomly assigned. After a cash windfall, only man-
agers with low experience spend more on new players. The increase in gross investment
is not linked to better performance for the team.
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1 Eﬀects of Immigration on Investment and Firm Cre-
ation
Jesus Gorrin
1.1 Introduction
For many net-receiving countries, immigration has become one of the main sources
of new labor over the past decades. According to the International Labor Organisation
(ILO) (2015), international immigration to industrialized countries increased at a yearly
rate of 30% from 2010 to 2013. Concerns about the economic eﬀects of immigration
on the native population make immigration a contentious political topic. According to
reports by the House of Commons, in 2007, British voters reported immigration as their
biggest policy concern (Lang, 2008). Polls also suggest that the Brexit vote in the United
Kingdom is connected to voter's attitudes toward immigration. An Ipsos poll documents
that one week before the 2016 referendum on Britains membership in the European
Union, more than half of voters supporting Leave considered immigration a key issue.1
The main economic arguments against immigration focus on its potential negative
short-term wage eﬀects. The logic sounds simple: immigration increases labor supply
and, therefore, decreases labor costs. Finding these negative wage eﬀects in the data,
however, is diﬃcult. According to Peri (2014), in 27 empirical studies, estimates of
elasticities of wages to increases in the share of immigrant workers range from -0.8 to
+0.8, with most studies reporting a zero eﬀect.
My paper contributes to the debate by examining how corporate investment adjusts to
labor supply increases caused by immigration. If investment adjusts contemporaneously
to labor, average wages might not decrease. To empirically measure the relationship be-
tween immigration and investment, I explore a unique natural experiment that increased
immigration to the United Kingdom: a change in policy that gave full working rights
to nationals from countries admitted to the EU in 2004. I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
strategy. Thereby, I combine the policy change with cross-sectional variation from ex ante
clusters of immigrants to provide reduced-form estimates of the eﬀects of immigration on
investment and ﬁrm creation.
The results show diﬀerent responses of investment to immigration in the intensive
and the extensive margins. First, for the intensive margin, ﬁrms located in districts with
higher ex ante immigration exposure show a signiﬁcant increase in ﬁxed asset investments
after the EU expansion announcement. A one-standard-deviation increase in ex ante
immigration exposure is associated with a 1.9% within-ﬁrm increase in long-term ﬁxed
1See https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/immigration-now-top-issue-voters-eu-referendum.
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assets. The increase in ﬁxed asset investment is not signiﬁcant when combining the
eﬀect of the policy announcement and the implementation. Fixed assets do not increase
more after the implementation of the policy. Furthermore, total within-ﬁrm assets do
not signiﬁcantly change either after announcement or after implementation of the policy.
These results suggest a simple, yet powerful, explanation for why labor costs do not drop
on average even if immigration increase labor supply: long-term adjustments to capital
investment may occur in anticipation of the labor supply increase.
Second, for the extensive margin, the results show a signiﬁcant increase in the incorpo-
ration of new ﬁrms after the open policy announcement and a further signiﬁcant increase
after the implementation. A one-standard-deviation increase in ex ante immigration ex-
posure leads to a 1.78% increase in the number of ﬁrms incorporated. The data show an
additional increase of 3% in the number of incorporated ﬁrms after the policy implemen-
tation. The increase is signiﬁcant when combining the eﬀect of the policy announcement
and implementation. Using the interaction between the policy announcement and the ex
ante immigration clusters as an instrument, a 0.5% immigration-induced labor supply
increasethe average UK labor force growthtranslates into a 17.5% increase in the
number of total incorporated ﬁrms.
Next, I examine whether there are heterogeneous eﬀects across the diﬀerent sectors.
Whether ﬁrm adjustments occur through the expansion of existing ﬁrms or through the
incorporation of new ﬁrms depends on the sector. For construction, there is a persistent
increase in both ﬁxed assets and total assets. The IV estimation reports that a 0.5%
immigration-induced labor supply shock translates into a 5% within-ﬁrm increase in ﬁxed
capital investment for all ﬁrms in the construction sector.
For ﬁrm creation, the eﬀects are larger in sectors that rely on human capital or that
provide services. Following Jeﬀers (2017), I deﬁne knowledge-intensive sectors based on
the type of occupations employed in the industry. I deﬁne knowledge ﬁrms as those with
a main classiﬁcation in computer programming, information technologies, architecture,
business consulting, engineering technical consulting, research, design, health, or educa-
tion.2 New ﬁrm incorporation signiﬁcantly increases both in the knowledge and in the
service sector in districts with higher immigration. These increases are associated with
a fundamental shift in the economic environment. The average ﬁrm in these sectors be-
comes smaller. Existing ﬁrms in the service sector signiﬁcantly decrease their total assets.
For the knowledge sector, there is also a decrease in existing ﬁrms assets, but it is not
signiﬁcant.
Regarding changes in wages, this paper shows that wages do not signiﬁcantly change
at the district level. The same results hold for the average remuneration within ﬁrms and
when separating ﬁrms by sectors of the economy. Moreover, the signs of the estimates
2The exact industries are reported in the Appendix.
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are not consistent. In construction, where adjustments occur through increases in ﬁxed
capital, the sign of the estimated wage elasticity is positive. In the knowledge and the
service sectors, where adjustments occur through an increase in the number of ﬁrms, the
signs are negative. However, in all of these sectors, the wage eﬀects are insigniﬁcant for
the average worker in pre-existing ﬁrms.
The results in this paper oﬀer a potential explanation for why prior studies have failed
to ﬁnd large eﬀects for immigration-induced labor supply increases on wages. In a model
with constant returns to scale, a labor supply increase generates negative short-term wage
eﬀects if ﬁrms do not invest enough. The lack of investment causes the marginal value
of labor to decrease in the short-term. As my results suggest, if investment adjusts in
anticipation of labor ﬂow increases, the transfer from workers to capital need not occur.
Investment decisions can also depend on immigration itself. Immigrants could set up
new ﬁrms or bring human capital necessary for the expansion of certain industries. This
paper also provides evidence of this mechanism.
Immigration has potential beneﬁts: it can change the talent pool and oﬀer incentives
to create new ﬁrms. A varied workforce can also improve the development of certain
sectors and reduce incentives for outsourcing (Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2013). If
capital ﬂows to areas in which it is scarce in relation to incoming labor, the economy
enjoys the beneﬁts of immigration without paying the short-term economic costs in terms
of lower wages.3 Moreover, not all immigration is equal. If immigration generates positive
changes in the skill composition of workers, then complementarities with capital can
smooth out the wage eﬀects (Lewis, 2013; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995).
Studying the relationship between immigration and investment is challenging because
the potential endogeneity concerns are many. Immigrants may settle in places where
growth is already expected.
This paper addresses these concerns using the following strategy. First, I rely on a
pre-determined cross-sectional measure related only to the immigrant group treated by
the policy. This strategy relies on the observation that immigrants relocate to places
where their peers are, rather than to places where the economy grows regardless of im-
migration. Nonetheless, the existing immigration clusters could already predict future
growth patterns. Area-time dummies restrict the eﬀects to the local level. For endogene-
ity to arise, the immigrant group needs to predict economic growth at a local level that is
smaller than a city. Because of the policy change, the empirical strategy can control for
unobservable time-invariant diﬀerences at the district level when studying ﬁrm creation.
Third, I rely on micro data at the ﬁrm-level to determine the intensive margin eﬀects. I
use ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects to control for the ﬁrms time-invariant characteristics. The pa-
3Some groups may still be harmed if new immigrants compete with workers from certain levels of skill,
as discussed by Borjas (1999) and Borjas (2003). Also, Card (2009) discusses the eﬀects of immigration
on inequality.
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per presents evidence that parallel trend assumptions are likely to hold for the variables
of interest in the period before the policy. Assuming the trends would have remained
parallel in the absence of the policy change, the reduced-form estimates have a causal
interpretation.
The paper also explores mechanisms that explain the main results in ﬁrm-level in-
vestment and in ﬁrm creation. Categorizing ﬁrms by their board composition in 2001, I
examine whether ﬁrm-level investment and employment decisions are related to the cul-
tural proximity between ﬁrm directors and the immigrants in a speciﬁc location.4 There
is no evidence that ﬁrms with Eastern European majority boards increase their ﬁxed
assets or employ more workers than their counterparts in the same district.
On the other hand, both UK and Eastern European nationals create more ﬁrms after
the immigration shock. This suggests that new British entrepreneurs also beneﬁt from
increased immigration. Furthermore, the rate of ﬁrms created by Eastern European
directors as a proportion of the total increases signiﬁcantly. These results suggest that
ﬁrm creation is driven by immigrants and not by previously existing social or cultural
ties.
Another potential mechanism behind the increase in investment is the change in the
skill mix that immigration brings. If immigration is predominantly low-skill, immigration
might substitute capital because immigrants take jobs in danger of automation (Lewis,
2011). If immigration is predominantly high-skill then it complements capital (Friedberg
and Hunt, 1995). Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012) provide evidence that,
over the past two decades, high-skill workers tend to immigrate to the United Kingdom.
I complement that evidence in three ways.
First, the data show a signiﬁcant increase in ﬁrm creation in the knowledge sector,
evidence that is in line with the ﬁndings of Ashraf and Ray (2017) for the United States.
Local-level immigration exposure is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in the number of
ﬁrms incorporated in the knowledge sector, which, by deﬁnition, relies on specialized la-
bor. Second, I show that, after the immigration policy shock, the educational attainment
of Eastern European immigrants, compared to that of natives, signiﬁcantly improves.
Third, the data show that the remuneration to the highest-paid director within ﬁrm sig-
niﬁcantly drops in the service sector. There are also negative eﬀects for directors in the
knowledge sector, but they are not signiﬁcant. For average workers, the eﬀect is never
signiﬁcant and the magnitude is smaller. Hence, the negative eﬀects on compensation
concentrate in the higher part of the income distribution within the ﬁrm. The negative
wage eﬀects for the best paid support the hypothesis that, in this setting, immigration
increases competition in the top part of the skill distribution.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, I study the interaction
4This is the channel explored by Burchardi and Hassan (2013).
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between labor markets and ﬁrm-level decisions. Like in Dustmann and Glitz (2011) and
Ashraf and Ray (2017), I document results opposite to the economic literature that shows
substitution among immigrants and capital investment (Lewis, 2011). My results show
that, in the short run, immigrant labor can complement capital investment in industries
like construction. Furthermore, immigration can also generate adjustments in the creation
of new ﬁrms in sectors that rely on human capital. Two key elements are necessary for
this result to occur: ﬁrst, the change in the skill composition of immigrants and, second,
UK policies. More speciﬁcally, Eastern European immigration to the United Kingdom,
in terms of educational attainment, tends to be of higher skill after the immigration
policy change, and the open border policy in the United Kingdom did not cap legal
immigration from Eastern Europe, but allowed a delay between the announcement and
the implementation.
I contribute, empirically, to the extensive ﬁnance and macroeconomic literature on
capital adjustments. Capital investments take time. There are costs of maintaining cap-
ital to react to new investment opportunities (Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007;
Duﬃe, 2010). Moreover, ﬁxed capital investments require both adjustment costs and
that assets are not easily traded in secondary markets (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006).
However, in the setting used in this paper, I show that ﬁxed capital investments react
in anticipation of labor ﬂows in construction. In other sectors, such as the knowledge
sector, which relies on human capital, or the service sector, which relies on labor-intensive
tasks, adjustments arise through new entrepreneurial activity. My paper suggests immi-
gration can also reduce barriers to entry when human capital is scarce. Entrepreneurship
increases, although the average ﬁrm is smaller.
I also contribute to the extensive literature on the eﬀects of immigration on labor
markets (see Card, 1990; Borjas, 2001; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Peri, 2012; Ottaviano,
Peri, and Wright, 2013). I provide additional evidence that average wages do not de-
crease when immigration increases. Finally, I document another positive link between
immigration and entrepreneurship.5 My interpretation of the results provided in this
paper suggests a more nuanced view of the costs and the beneﬁts of immigration.
1.2 The immigration policy change
My analysis focuses on a major change in immigration policy in the United Kingdom
triggered by the expansion of the European Union in 2004, a time during which the
United Kingdom was a member.
After a long period of discussions, in April 2003, the EU announced the Treaty of
Accession, with the objective of incorporating new members. The treaty implementa-
tion date was May 2004. The implementation of the treaty allowed immigration policy
5See Hunt (2011), Decker et al. (2014), and Fairlie and Lofstrom (2013).
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discretion for a limited period of time. Old EU members could delay working rights
for nationals from new admitted countries for a maximum of 7 years. Only 3 older
membersthe United Kingdom, Sweden, and Irelandallow nationals from incoming
country members to work freely from May 2004.
For the case of the United Kingdom, foreign nationals from the newly admitted coun-
tries had the right to work conditional on registration to National Insurance. This reg-
istration did not provide welfare beneﬁts. Furthermore, registration was not automatic.
However, it was in the best interest of immigrants to register since it was a legal require-
ment.
The paper focuses on immigration from 8 newly admitted Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Hungary.6 Figure 1 oﬀers a summary of the immigration decisions across older EU
members.
Following the policy change, the United Kingdom experienced a large inﬂow of people
from Central and Eastern Europe. The amount of immigration was underestimated by
the British government at the time of the policy implementation, partly because the gov-
ernment was expecting more EU countries to also grant full labor rights. A report by the
Home Oﬃce (Casanova et al., 2003) estimated an inﬂux of 13,000 long-term immigrants
per year. According to ﬁgures from the Organisation of National Statistics (ONS), the
number was closer to 50,000 per year. After the 2004 expansion and the subsequent open
border policy, British attitudes toward immigration changed signiﬁcantly. According to
an immigration report by the House of Commons (Lang, 2008), polls documented that in
the 1990s only 5% of the British population considered immigration the most important
issue in Britain. By 2007, the number increased to 40%. For the next EU expansion, the
British government changed its policy. When the opportunity resurfaced in 2007 with
new members, the British government decided not to open labor markets. In other words,
for the subsequent expansion the United Kingdom adopted a restrictive policy similar to
the ones adopted by other European countries in 2004. This policy is consistent with the
idea that the British government decided to control immigration after the open border
policy of 2004.
According to ONS data, National Insurance registrations increased after 2004, point-
ing to an important immigration-induced labor supply shock. As I show in Figures 2 and
3, the increase is driven by incoming nationals from Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. After the implementation of the open border policy, nationals from these countries
of origin (commonly referred to as the EU8 group) became the most representative group
in terms of registrations. They represented 3.1% of the registrations by 2002 and 38.4%
6Malta and Cyprus were also admitted, but their eﬀect was small and, for historical reasons, they
already had some rights in the United Kingdom. Moreover, their population inside the United Kingdom
was not large enough to be reported at the local level in the Census.
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by 2005. However, it does not seem that the increase came at the expense of a reduction
in the number of new workers from other groups. Figure 2 shows that registrations remain
constant for nationals from European countries with pre-existing labor rights (EU15) af-
ter the policy. Figure 3 reveals that nationals from other European countries not yet
admitted to the EU, but that would be admitted in 2007, registered at the same rate.7
Therefore, the policy expanded the number of workers and should not be interpreted as
a mere recomposition of the immigrants that were admitted as workers in the United
Kingdom.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Employment and National Insurance data
To measure immigration at the district level, I use both employment data from the
Department of Work and Pensions and census data from the Organisation of National
Statistics (ONS). After the EU expansion of 2004, nationals from the newly admitted
countries needed to register a National Insurance number to obtain the right to work
in the United Kingdom. Figure 1 represents the number of national insurance numbers
registered by year. I divide the registrations into two groups: nationals from new countries
and nationals from countries that were already part of the EU. The ﬁgure shows that,
after the policy change, registrations from the new group surpassed those from the original
EU members.
National Insurance number (NINO) registrations are not a measure of long-term im-
migration, and they do not account for immigrates who return to their native country.
Registrations only account for the district in which immigrants register their intention to
work in the United Kingdom. For registration, any immigrant needs a UK address. This
address determines the district of registration.
Despite its problems, not accounting immigrates that return and accounting for reg-
istration near the ﬁrst address of the registrant, the number of NINO registrations is the
best possible measure in this paper for several reasons. First, long-term immigration is
normally measured at the local level in the census, but my analysis requires a higher
frequency. To determine the eﬀects of new immigration on investment, I need at least
yearly data. Therefore, I use NINO registrations as a proxy.
I aggregate labor data at the district level. Because of the availability of data, my
analysis is restricted to England. I use the 326 English districts to construct the summary
statistics. The average population of a district, as of 2002, is approximately 92,000 people
with a standard deviation of 63,042 people. In terms of population, English districts are
comparable to counties in the United States.
7The same patterns emerge if I use registrations of workers from the rest of Europe.
16
In Table 1.1, I provide the summary statistics for the National Insurance number
(NINO) registrations and employment data both after and before the 2004 EU expansion.
The total number of NINOs by any country of origin doubled after the EU expansion,
going from 842.9 to 1,556.3 registrations. Most of the increase is related to the inﬂow
of nationals from countries admitted in 2004 (the EU8 group). Before the change, an
average of 34.3 EU8 workers registered in a speciﬁc district, but after the policy change,
registrations increased to 572.1 per district. This number made the EU8 group the largest
source of registrations, surpassing the previous dominant group: the old EU members who
had free labor mobility since the 1990s. Between 2004 and 2007, one-third of all NINO
registrations to foreigners in England were issued to nationals of countries admitted to
the EU in 2004.
In the census, the data are reported at the local level, which is, in some cases, smaller
than the district level. When a local authority does not form a unique district, I aggregate
the data at the district level. Mapping between local authorities and districts is not one-
to-one, because sometimes a local authority belongs to multiple districts. If this is the
case, I assign each local authority to a single district based on how much of the territory
belongs to the local authority.
I use 2001 census data to construct the pre-existing immigration cluster measures.
The measure is constructed using the percentage of workers from Central and Eastern
European origins. The 2001 census does not provide the EU8 subdivision. I use a proxy
that accounts for the number of people from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria. An average
of 2.3% (SD = 2.1%) of workers have this origin as of 2001.
1.3.2 Firm directors' data
The data are retrieved from Bureau van Dijk's ORBIS and FAME ﬁrm databases.
The data on directors (board members) cover the entire universe of ﬁrms in the United
Kingdom.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide ﬁrm-level summary statistics for the characteristics of the
board of directors. Table 1.2 provides information about the board characteristics for all
ﬁrms in the United Kingdom that were incorporated by 2000. Firms established before
the policy have boards with a similar nationality composition over time.8 Around 91% of
directors are British. This proportion slowly increases over time. Likewise, the proportion
of EU directors remains relatively ﬂat over time. Around 4.5% of directors are nationals
from old EU members. Only 0.08% are nationals from countries that were admitted by
the EU in 2004 (EU8).
8This does not mean that director turnover is zero. These results could be driven by two reasons: (1)
the persistence of directors or (2) the replacement of directors with other directors who have a similar
origin.
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On the other hand, there seems to be a structural change on the board composition
for younger ﬁrms. Table 1.3 provides information for the composition of newly created
ﬁrms by the ﬁrms year of incorporation. Firms created after 2000 are more diverse in
terms of the nationalities of the directors. The proportion of directors from countries
admitted before 2004 (EU15) increased from 4.6% in 2000 to a maximum of 9.6% in
2006. Similarly, the percentage of board members from EU countries admitted in 2004
(EU8) increased from 0.08% to almost 1% by 2008.
1.3.3 Firm ﬁnancial data
I collect the ﬁnancial data from BvD's FAME database.9 To study ﬁrm-level employ-
ment, I restrict the sample to ﬁrms that report at least one employee between 2001 and
2005. Table 1.4 reports the summary statistics.
The average total remuneration by ﬁrms to workers remains constant over time .
The average number of employees increases from 243 to 310 over the sample. Moreover,
the average salary per employee decreases over the sample. On the other hand, both
total director remuneration and the remuneration for the highest-paid director increases
over this period. The pay gap between workers and directors widens. The increase in
directors' compensation is consistent with the stylized facts in the executive compensation
literature (Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter, 2017). More importantly, it is also consistent
with patterns among public ﬁrms in the FTSE 100 (CIPD Executive Pay Report, 2017).
Financial reporting is not required for all ﬁrms, and, even when required, not all ﬁrms
ﬁle the same variables. Normally, ﬁrms limit themselves to providing information about
their assets.
For some of the analysis, I aggregate the data at the district level. In most instances,
ORBIS directly reports the ﬁrms district. However, for special cases, like London, the
data report the whole city and not speciﬁc districts. In these cases, I identify the ﬁrms
postal code and then aggregate postal codes at the district level. Once I assign each ﬁrm
location to a district, I match this information with immigration and census data.
1.4 Empirical setting
There are many identiﬁcation challenges to disentangle in determining the causal
eﬀects of immigration on investment and ﬁrm creation. First, the decision to settle in
a speciﬁc location is potentially driven by other factors that increase labor demand.
Furthermore, demand factors are persistent. Hence, immigrants could be settling in
districts that would have higher investment regardless of immigration. If this is the case,
9This database was constructed on a joint eﬀort by Juanita Gonzalez-Uribe, Daniel Paravisini, Su
Wang, the Abraaj Group at FMG, the LSE library team and Bureau Van Dijk.
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a standard ordinary least square (OLS) regression of immigration on investment would
lead to biased results.
An event study on the eﬀects of the open border policy does not completely address
these problems. The EU8 admission to the European Union in May 2004 is an endogenous
decision, and the admission itself was planned. Furthermore, the expansion required the
agreement of all EU members. EU negotiations considered the economic conditions at the
time. Moreover, the adoption of an open border policy in the United Kingdom after the
European Union expansion is also endogenous. This decision reveals information about
the state of the economy, even in the counterfactual case of no change in immigration
policy. If the British economy was expected to grow signiﬁcantly and demand more labor,
regardless of the EU8 admission, the diﬀerence before and after the policy overestimates
the eﬀect of immigration.
To provide more convincing evidence, I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy. The
source of cross-sectional variation is the proportion of Eastern European workers as of
2001 in a speciﬁc district. To add time variation, I interact this measure with the UK im-
migration policy change. To address potential endogeneity problems, I control for district
ﬁxed eﬀects and wider area economic trends when studying district-level outcomes.10 I
control for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, rather that district ﬁxed eﬀects, and economic area trends
when studying ﬁrm-level outcomes. This is an improvement over the standard shift-share
instrument that predicts future ﬂows of migrants based on past stock of migrants from
the same origin. By exploiting the policy change, I absorb time-invariant characteristics
of the locations where original Eastern European migrants settled before the policy.
To identify the causal eﬀects of immigration on investment, the ideal research design
consists of an experiment that randomly allocates diﬀerent levels of immigration across
districts in the United Kingdom and then measures the eﬀects of immigration on invest-
ment. This paper relies on an interaction between a natural experiment (the announced
immigration policy change) and an ex ante measure of immigration clusters. This identi-
ﬁcation is similar to the shift share instrument Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001)
originally used.
My empirical strategy resembles the ideal experiment in two ways. First, the pre-
existing clusters of immigrants aﬀect the intensity with which each district is treated.
Immigrants are more likely to settle in locations where there is a larger community of
immigrants with the same origin. For this reason, I use EU8 worker clusters, and not
total immigration. Using stocks of immigrants from a speciﬁc origin diminishes concerns
that aggregate demand shocks drive immigration. One important identifying assumption
is that the immigration pull factors are related to closeness to peers rather than economic
characteristics of particular locations. However, this strategy cannot control for district-
10I control for NUTS2-time dummies to capture local economic-wide shocks. There are 34 such areas
in England.
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level diﬀerences. If the settlement of immigrants in the past is related to unobservable and
persistent district-level characteristics, the strategy may still overestimate the beneﬁts of
immigration.
To address this issue, I complement the strategy by exploiting the time variation
introduced by the policy change. The time variation allows me to control for district-
level ﬁxed eﬀects. I also control for area-wide trends. Therefore, I can address the problem
pointed out by Borjas (1999) of serially correlated shocks causing the immigration clusters
in the ﬁrst place.
Spillover eﬀects and open economy adjustments are some weaknesses of using an iden-
tiﬁcation that relies on spatial diﬀerences across locations. For example, it is possible
that an increase in immigration in one location displaces native workers to another lo-
cation with fewer immigrants. I cannot rule out this possibility. Accordingly, my results
should be interpreted as local eﬀects, and care should be taken when assessing the eﬀects
at higher levels of aggregation.
To construct the cross-sectional measure of ex ante immigration clusters, I use the
proportion of Eastern European workers in an English district as of 2001.11 The average
proportion of Eastern European workers is 2.3%, with a standard deviation of 2.1%.12
To exploit the time variation from the policy and control for unobservable district char-
acteristics, my measure of immigration exposure is the interaction between the ex -ante
immigration cluster, an indicator for the policy announcement, and another indicator for
the policy implementation.
The main identiﬁcation assumption is that all diﬀerent unobservable factors that
may drive the outcome variables are time invariant, conditional on controls, and can
be controlled for with a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. To provide evidence in favor of this
assumption, Figures 6 and 7 present the graphical results of a regression of the relevant
outcome variable on the relevant ﬁxed eﬀects and the interactions of the indicators and
the cross-sectional exposure measure. The speciﬁcation controls for area-time dummies
and the relevant ﬁxed eﬀects; ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects for ﬁxed assets, employees, sales, and
average remuneration; and district ﬁxed eﬀects for ﬁrm creation and new Eastern Eu-
ropean registrations. The ﬁgures also report the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Because the
intensive margin data are yearly, there are only two observations pre-treatment. Hence,
I can estimate only one coeﬃcient in the pre-treatment period. For ﬁrm creation and
new EU8 registrations, I rely on quarterly data. Therefore, Figure 7 provides coeﬃcient
11My analysis is restricted to England because of data availability.
12The ONS did not separate the EU8 group in the 2001 Census. Instead, they provide the number of
workers from a group called EUplus, which accounts for what is now known as EU8 plus Bulgaria and
Romania. Alternatively, the ONS provides data on Polish workers, a predominant group. These data are
less accurate because the ONS only reports aggregate data if at least 15 workers are identiﬁed. As a result,
the Polish group has more missing districts. However, even when using ex ante Polish workers as the
source of cross-sectional variation, results in investment, employment, and ﬁrm creation are signiﬁcant
and exhibit the same signs. Nonetheless, average within-ﬁrm average remuneration decreases.
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estimates up to four periods before the policy announcement.
All the coeﬃcients before the policy announcement are statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Therefore, I cannot reject the hypothesis of no diﬀerential trends in the pre-
treatment period. As long as this assumption also holds for the post-treatment period,
which is not testable, the reduced-form regressions provide an estimation of the causal
eﬀect of ex ante immigration clusters on future immigration, the intensive margin invest-
ment, and ﬁrm creation.
The interpretation of the reduced-form eﬀects relies purely on the identifying assump-
tions discussed before. However, Figure 7 shows a positive and signiﬁcant relationship
between the interaction of policy and ex ante immigration clusters on new EU8 regis-
tration. Table 1.6 shows a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between an interaction
that combines the policy announcement and implementation into one indicator function
and the immigration exposure measure. This paper uses this fact to proceed to an in-
strumental variable (IV) estimation of new EU8 registrations on corporate-level capital
investments and on the creation of new ﬁrms. Contrary to the reduced-form estimates,
the IV estimation has a direct economic interpretation.
For IV to provide a causal estimation of the local average treatment eﬀect in a het-
erogeneous eﬀect model, four assumptions must be satisﬁed (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
First, a ﬁrst stage between the instrument and the independent variable must exist. Ev-
idence points in favor of this assumption. Second, conditional on controls, treatment
must be as good as randomly assigned. This assumption is the same as that required for
identiﬁcation using my diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy. Third the instrument aﬀects the
outcome variable only through the variable of interest, an assumption known as the ex-
clusion restriction. Fourth, the instrument aﬀects the variable of interest in one direction
only, an assumption known as monotonicity.
The IV estimation comes at a cost. In general, it is more diﬃcult to satisfy the
identifying assumptions for IV than for diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences. Furthermore, because
the policy is not immediately implemented, there might be anticipation between the an-
nouncement and the implementation. There are employment restrictions for immigrants
in this window, but not for ﬁrm creation or for investment. Therefore, I need to combine
the eﬀects of the announcement and the policy in a single interaction term with the ex
ante immigration measure. This makes the estimation less precise.
However, IV provides a direct estimation of the eﬀect of the increase of new regis-
tered workers on the outcome variables. If the identifying assumptions hold, IV can be
interpreted as the causal eﬀect of gross increases in new EU8 registration on ﬁrm-level
investments and ﬁrm creation.
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1.5 Main results
1.5.1 Predicting the allocation of new EU8 registrations
Before I document the eﬀects of immigration on investment, I test whether the measure
of immigration exposurethe ex ante immigration clusters interacted with the policy
positively predicts immigration after the policy shock.
To generate the measure of immigration exposure, I collect the data from the 2001
Census. The Census does not separate the EU8, but accounts for a group that includes
the EU8 plus other two countries: Romania and Bulgaria. I use this group to construct
my proxy for the ex ante proportion of workers. 13
I test whether the interaction between immigration clusters and the policy predicts
future patterns using the following speciﬁcation:
ShareNewRegisteredWorkersEU8dt = αd + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt + εdt.
ShareNewRegisteredWorkersEU8dt measures the proportion of NINO registrations
issued in a quarter divided by the number of workers in 2001. I normalize by workers
in 2001 to avoid the mechanical increase in the denominator caused by the immigration
policy change. Changes in the share of registered workers can be interpreted as a shift
in the labor supply. αd is district-level ﬁxed eﬀects that account for time-invariant unob-
servables. αct is an area-time dummy to account for local-level shocks. An area covers a
group of contiguous districts. Area refers to the NUTS2 statistical aggregation from the
Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS). This aggregation covers neighboring districts all over
England. There are 34 such areas, covering around 10 districts each. FractionEasternd is
the ex ante proportion of workers who are Eastern European nationals.14 PostAnnouncet
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the expansion is announced in the
second quarter of 2003. PostImplementt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
after the implementation of the expansion in May 2004. The time series goes from the
ﬁrst quarter of 2002 until the fourth quarter of 2006.
The main speciﬁcation controls for area-quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. Therefore, the variation
between districts inside an area-time determines the source of identiﬁcation in this em-
13The ONS also reports the number of Polish workers, the most prevalent nationality among the EU8
group, per district. I can also use the data that account for Polish nationals separately. I prefer to use
the Eastern European group, which better predicts future immigration patterns. Moreover, the ONS
reports the number of immigrants only when that number surpasses 15 workers in a local authority. The
Polish group is a subset of EUplus and, hence, has more missing data.
14That is, EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria.
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pirical strategy. For example, within an area-time, like Inner London in a speciﬁc year,
the identiﬁcation captures the eﬀect across diﬀerent districts.
Table 1.5, Panel A, shows that the measure of exposure (i.e., ex ante proportion of
Eastern workers) positively and signiﬁcantly predicts an increase of new registrations,
both after the policy announcement and after the policy implementation. The eﬀect is
larger after policy implementation. Accounting for both the announcement and imple-
mentation of the policy, a one-standard-deviation change in the ex ante ratio of Eastern
European leads to an additional quarterly ﬂow of 0.15% new workers, as a proportion of
the initial workforce in 2001.
To provide better economic interpretation, I separate districts by a dummy,HighFractiond
, which takes the value of 1 if the district has an above-median proportion of Eastern
European workers and 0 if it has a value below. Table 1.5, Panel B, provides the re-
sults. Combining the eﬀect of the announcement and the policy, every quarter, highly
exposed districts receive an increase in the ﬂow of workers equivalent to 0.15% of the ini-
tial workforce in 2001, that is, the same as the standardized result using the continuous
measure.
As a comparison, over the 20th Century, the average yearly UK employment growth
was 0.5% (Lindsay, 2003). Taking 2001 as the base year and assuming the rate of growth
to be constant year by year, the increase in labor supply by 2004 is approximately 0.51%
over a year, or 0.13% over a quarter. Therefore, a one-standard-deviation shift in the
ex ante immigration cluster causes an eﬀect larger than the average labor force growth.
This is an economically meaningful shock.15
The results are robust and even more signiﬁcant if I use a yearly frequency and control
for area-year dummies. This result is also important because the ﬁnancial data are only
available at a yearly frequency. Hence, the eﬀect within ﬁrms is only analyzed at a yearly
frequency. Alternatively, as a robustness check I separate the eﬀect of announcement and
policy in two non-overlapping variables. Both the announcement and the implementation
are signiﬁcant, but the eﬀect of the implementation is larger.
1.5.2 District-level investment
In the standard model with homogeneous labor, an increase in labor supply makes cap-
ital relatively more scarce and, therefore, more valuable. In labor economics, researchers
typically assume that, in the short-term, capital is ﬁxed and labor is not (Borjas, 2014).
However, if capital markets are eﬃcient, there is less reason to believe that the capital
adjustments should lag labor ﬂows. It is possible that capital takes time to build, but, in
15To provide this back-of-the-envelope calculation, I take year 2001, my base year, as a 100. I measure
the total change in the index from 2003 to 2004. The change is equivalent to 0.51. As a percentage of
the base year, this is 0.51%.
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this setting, ﬁrms could increase capital in anticipation of the open policy. On the other
hand, until the policy was implemented, ﬁrms had restrictions on hiring foreign workers.
In this paper, intensive margin investment refers to long-term physical capital in-
vestment. Since, under the accounting conventions, only changes in ﬁxed assets can be
interpreted as long-term capital investments, I use this measure. The eﬀects are positive,
but not signiﬁcant, if I measure the eﬀects over total assets and restrict the sample to
ﬁrms that have positive ﬁxed assets.
In this section, I present evidence that ﬁxed capital investment increases for the
average ﬁrm in anticipation of the change in immigration policy. More importantly,
capital ﬂows to locations where it becomes more valuable: districts that are expected to
have a bigger inﬂux of immigrants after the open border policy. Nonetheless, the change
is only a one-oﬀ event. If I combine the eﬀect of the announcement and the policy, the
increase in investment is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Because of data constraints, I report regressions of ﬁxed assets at a yearly frequency.
The regression uses all ﬁrms in the sample, both newly incorporated and previously
existing ﬁrms, and measures how the average ﬁxed assets of a ﬁrm located in a particular
district change when exposed to immigration changes. To calculate the district-level
averages, I ﬁrst take the logarithm of ﬁxed assets for each ﬁrm and then take the average
within each district-year.16 The results are described using the following equation:
ln(yit) = αi + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt + εdt.
Table 1.6, Panel A, shows that ﬁxed assets signiﬁcantly increase after the announce-
ment, but they decrease, though not signiﬁcantly, after the implementation of the policy.
After the EU expansion announcement, a one-standard-deviation increase in the exposure
measure increases ﬁxed assets at the district level by 1.8%.17 If I subsume the announce-
ment and implementation of the policy in a single dummy variable and interact it with
the ex ante immigration cluster, the eﬀect is positive and equivalent to an increase of
1.9% on ﬁxed assets. However, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Panel D of Table 1.6 presents the results of the eﬀect of an increase in the share of
new EU8 registration on ﬁxed asset investment for all ﬁrms in a district. The regression
controls for district ﬁxed eﬀects and area-time dummies. The sign is positive, but not
16The advantage of this approach, as explained in Borjas (2014), is the interpretation of the average.
The average of the log is the geometric mean. On the other hand, the log of the average does not have
a similar interpretation. Fortunately, in this setting, the two options yield qualitatively similar results.
17The standard deviation of the immigration clusters is 0.021. The regression is log-level, so %
∆y=100*(eβ − 1) for every unit x increases.
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signiﬁcant. Table 1.6 also shows the elasticity of the average wage within a district to
an increase in the share of Eastern European immigrants. Even though, the signs are
negative, they are statistically insigniﬁcant.
The district-level regressions combine the two margins in which investment can react
to an increase in labor supply. On the one hand, investment can increase in the intensive
margin, as existing ﬁrms increase capital expenditures to incorporate incoming workers.
In the extensive margins, the labor supply increase may make it easier for new ﬁrms to
enter the market. I disentangle these eﬀects next.
1.5.3 Firm-level results
In this section I use ﬁrm-level data to provide evidence that the increase in investment
in long-term capital is signiﬁcant for ﬁrms that were created before 2001 only at the
moment of the announcement. The eﬀects are not persistent on average, but they are
persistent for a particular sector: construction. When I study the eﬀects over total assets,
stark diﬀerences emerge. The construction sector also experiences a signiﬁcant, persistent
increase in total assets. Nonetheless, for the service sector, the data show a signiﬁcant
decrease in total asset investment. This does not mean that investment in the knowledge
and in the service sectors decrease as a whole. The margin of adjustment is diﬀerent in
these sectors. Later, I will show that the total number of ﬁrms created in these sectors
signiﬁcantly increases.
These results are relevant for two reasons. First, I document results consistent with
complementarities between Eastern European migration and long-term ﬁxed capital in-
vestment for the construction sector. This result is not obvious. The complementarities
depend on the skill composition of the incoming workforce. In particular, immigration
could replace capital in automatized industries (Lewis, 2011). Evidence of an increase in
capital accumulation supports complementarities between immigrant workers and cap-
ital investment. Second, for immigration to decrease average wages in the short-term,
capital should lag labor (Borjas, 2014). I show that the ﬂow of capital, at least in the
United Kingdom during 2004, anticipated the labor ﬂows from immigration. This is a
potential explanation for why the search for negative wage eﬀects from immigration has
been elusive in the labor literature.18
ln(yit) = αi + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt + εdt
18See Kerr and Kerr (2011) for a survey of the economic impacts of immigration on employment and
on wages.
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In this regression I control for alphai, that is, ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects. I also control
for area-time dummies. The regression reports, within a geographical area-time, how
much ﬁrms located in a high ex ante Eastern European immigration district increase
their ﬁxed assets compared to ﬁrms located in a low Eastern European district. As a
robustness check, and to diminish multicollinearity concerns, I separate the eﬀect of the
announcement and the implementation in two non-overlapping variables. The estimation
of the eﬀect of the announcement is quantitatively similar and signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of
the implementation remains insigniﬁcant.
In Table 1.7, Panel A, I document a signiﬁcant increase in ﬁxed assets within ﬁrms
after the announcement of the EU expansion. To ease interpretations, I provide stan-
dardized results for the reduced-form regression. A one-standard-deviation increase in
the size of the ex ante immigration cluster translates into an increase of approximately
1% in ﬁxed assets. The increase in the number of employees within ﬁrms after the pol-
icy implementation is quantitatively similar. A one-standard-deviation increase in the ex
ante immigration cluster translates into an increase of 0.76% in the number of employees.
These results are in line with the particularities of the policy. Before the policy
implementation, ﬁrms could not hire EU8 nationals without issuing a work permit. The
United Kingdom lifted the restriction in 2004. Firms could invest more in expectation
of a labor supply increase from the open policy implementation, but could not yet hire
new immigrants. If capital takes time to build, the result that ﬁxed capital investment
precedes the labor supply shock is natural.
Second, I explore the eﬀects of immigration exposure sales per employee. This is
a proxy for productivity. As Peri (2002) shows, immigration can also aﬀect ﬁrm-level
productivity. In Table 1.7, I show that the eﬀects are positive and statistically signiﬁcant
only after the announcement, that is, before foreign workers can be hired by the ﬁrm.
This eﬀect disappears when I combine the eﬀects of the announcement and the policy
implementation. Therefore, the data do not support the claim that immigration increased
productivity within existing ﬁrms.
One important cost immigration may have on the native workers is a potential decrease
in their remuneration. Firms could also face diﬀerent factor prices when immigration
increases. A positive labor supply shock could reduce average labor costs. I estimate
the average employee remuneration within the ﬁrm. I ﬁnd no evidence of a signiﬁcant
reduction in average remuneration. Table 1.7, Panel A, shows the within-ﬁrm eﬀects for
the average worker in the ﬁrm and for the highest-paid director. Both results are not
signiﬁcant.19
I adopt an IV approach to measure the eﬀect of immigration on capital investment,
employment, and sales per employee. For IV to be interpreted as the local average
19Dustmann and Glitz (2011) use a diﬀerent methodology but ﬁnd similar results. They ﬁnd within-
ﬁrm factor price adjustments are not signiﬁcant, but changes in factor intensities are.
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treatment eﬀect, the instrument needs to satisfy three assumptions in addition to the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy, which only requires random assignment conditional on
controls.
First, a ﬁrst stage must exist. This assumption is directly testable, and in Table 1.7, I
ﬁnd evidence that the ex ante immigration measure signiﬁcantly predicts future migration
patterns .20 Second, the exclusion restriction, which in this case requires that my measure
of ex ante immigration exposure aﬀects the outcome variable only through changes in the
share of new Eastern European workers, must exist. Third, ex ante immigration exposure
aﬀects future immigration patterns monotonically.
If these assumptions hold, the IV estimation provides a direct estimate of the eﬀects
of immigration on ﬁrm-level ﬁxed asset investment, employment, and sales per employee.
The reduced-form results from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation do not have this in-
terpretation. In Table 1.7, I report the eﬀects of an increase in the share of EU8-registered
workers on the change in ﬁxed assets, employment, and sales per employee. The data
show, on average, no permanent eﬀects within the ﬁrm through productivity adjustments,
factor price adjustments, or investment. There is a signiﬁcant and permanent increase in
ﬁrm-level employment, but only after the policy implementation.
At the same time, the data show diﬀerential eﬀects when separating ﬁrms by economic
sectors. Table 1.9, Panel B, combines the eﬀect of the announcement and the policy into
one indicator variable. It treats the interaction between ex ante immigration exposure
and the announcement as the explanatory variable. This result can be interpreted as a
permanent shift to the outcome variable of interest after the announcement of the EU
expansion. There is a permanent and signiﬁcant increase in ﬁxed asset investment only
for construction. Table 1.9, Panel C, shows the estimate for an IV regression in which
the proportion of new EU8 registrations per worker is instrumented by the interaction
between ex ante immigration clusters and the expansion announcement. A 1% increase
in the proportion of new EU8 registers in a district translates into an increase of 1.26%
in ﬁxed asset investments at the ﬁrm level for construction ﬁrms located in that district.
For total assets, the increase is equivalent to 19.1%, which is not statistically signiﬁcant.
For the service and the knowledge sectors, there is no persistent increase in ﬁxed
asset investment. Moreover, for the service sector, the total assets signiﬁcantly decrease.
In the next section, I document another margin by which the changes are persistent.
Immigration increases the rate at which ﬁrms are created in the economy.
20The F-stat of a regression on the excluded instruments is well above the minimum requirement (i.e.,
F-stat = 10) suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005).
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1.5.4 Firm creation
In this subsection, I explore the eﬀects of immigration on investment in new ﬁrms
across two dimensions. First, I show the eﬀects of immigration exposure on the number
of ﬁrms created at the district level. I analyze these eﬀects across diﬀerent sectors of the
economy. Second, I explore the eﬀects on the size of the new ﬁrms.
Because I observe the exact date at which each ﬁrm is incorporated, I estimate re-
gressions at a quarterly frequency. Annual regressions provide consistent results. The
following equation summarizes the main speciﬁcation:
ln(Firmsdt) = αd + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt + εdt.
F irmsdt is the total number of ﬁrms created in a district. There are no ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects in this speciﬁcation because ﬁrm creation is measured at the district level. The
time series goes from the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 until the fourth quarter of 2006.
In Table 1.6, I show ﬁrm creation signiﬁcantly increases in districts with higher ex ante
exposure to immigration. After the announcement, a one-standard-deviation increase in
ex ante Eastern European workers correlates with an increase of 1.78% in ﬁrm creation.
Furthermore, the policy implementation increases ﬁrm creation by an additional 3, which
is an economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
I use IV to show the eﬀect of an increase in immigration ﬂow in ﬁrm creation. Table
1.6 provides the estimates. The IV estimation shows a signiﬁcant increase in ﬁrm creation.
The average quarterly ﬂow of EU8 workers in the sample is around 0.20% of the labor
force. The IV estimation shows that an additional 0.20% quarterly ﬂow of EU8 workers
as a proportion initial workforce translates into a 6.7% increase in ﬁrm creation at the
district level.
Next, I examine whether the new ﬁrms created after the immigration policy change
are diﬀerent in size compared with the ﬁrms created before the policy change. Normally,
young ﬁrms do not report their assets for the year of incorporation. To minimize this
source of attrition, I collect data on ﬁxed assets for each company either, in the year of
incorporation or one year after. Still attrition is important. I summarize each district by
the average of the natural logarithm of the ﬁxed assets of created ﬁrms. Table 1.6 shows
the results. The estimates are inconclusive mainly because of the large standard errors,
but the sign suggests that these new ﬁrms are smaller than the ones created before 2003.
I combine the eﬀects of the announcement and the policy implementation and ﬁnd a
one-standard-deviation increase in immigration ex ante exposure translates into a 0.65%
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decrease in the ﬁxed assets of the average entering the market.
After dividing the eﬀects among the sectors, the data show another source of het-
erogeneity. Table 1.10, Panel B, shows a signiﬁcant increase in the number of ﬁrms in
the knowledge sector, a sector characterized by human -capital-intensive tasks.21 Panel
C presents the IV estimates. New EU8 registrations, which are equivalent to 1% in the
labor force, are associated with a signiﬁcant increase of 7.59% in the number of knowl-
edge ﬁrms. The data show a similar result for the service sector, although the skills
needed for these tasks are lower than those needed for the knowledge sector. Table 1.10,
Panel C, documents that a 1% increase in new EU8 workers registrations translates into
a signiﬁcant increase of 9.96% in ﬁrms created in the service sector.
This increase in ﬁrm creation is associated with evidence of competition with pre-
existing ﬁrms in these sectors. Table 1.7 shows that pre-existing ﬁrms decrease their total
assets in the service and in the knowledge sectors. The decrease is statistically signiﬁcant
for the service sector. A 1% increase in the share of immigration-driven labor supply
decreases the average service ﬁrm by 12.8%. For the knowledge sector, the decrease,
although not statistically signiﬁcant, is 7.73%.
The data show no signiﬁcant eﬀects for the remuneration of the average worker within
the ﬁrm in any of the main economic sectors studied. It does show a signiﬁcant decrease in
remuneration for the highest-paid director in the service sector after the policy implemen-
tation. If I combine the eﬀects of the policy announcement and policy implementation,
the highest-paid directors experience a decrease in their pay in the service and in the
knowledge sectors. The results are not statistically signiﬁcant, but they are economi-
cally meaningful. In the knowledge sector, an 1% increase in Eastern European worker
registrations as a proportion of existing workers decreased the highest-paid director's re-
muneration by 12%. For the service sector, the decrease is equivalent to 11%. This is
consistent with the increase in competition from the newly incorporated ﬁrms.
There is still one important question about ﬁrm creation. The creation of new ﬁrms
might increase the probability of ﬁrms leaving. My sample comprises all dead and existing
ﬁrms over the sample from 2001 until 2006. Firms are forced to provide information to
Company's House every year. I assume a ﬁrm dies if no information is provided after a
particular year or if the ﬁrm is oﬃcially desincorporated. In the Appendix I show there
are no eﬀects after the announcement and implementation of the policy in the destruction
of ﬁrms. This is true for both the number of ﬁrms destroyed and for the probability of a
ﬁrm dying over a year after it is created.
21I provide a list of the industries included in this sector in the appendix.
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1.5.5 Robustness
One potential shortcoming of my identiﬁcation strategy is that spillovers across dis-
tricts might bias the results towards zero. For example, if migrants tend to work in
diﬀerent districts than those in which they register, districts close to Eastern European
hubs may also experience increases in investment or potential changes in wages. To avoid
this problem I replicate the main results of my paper at a diﬀerent aggregation level. I
use Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) as constructed using the census of 2001. According
to the ONS, TTWAs are areas constructed in a way that resemble labour markets, areas
in which workers both live and work (Prothero, 2016). If the expected increase in labor
force from the policy change induces ﬁrms to invest more, the eﬀects should be larger at
the higher aggregation level. This is because The cost of a worker moving across diﬀerent
travel to work areas is higher.
The aggregation comes at a cost. The coarser level does not allow me to control for
NUTS2 area trends because travel to work areas might be larger than NUTS2 areas. If
cities suﬀer shocks that are particular to them and happen at the same time than the
policy announcement, my identiﬁcation would not provide causal eﬀects. To mitigate this
issue, I control for region trends.22 As expected, the investment results are even stronger
and more signiﬁcant at this level of aggregation. There is signiﬁcantly more ﬁrm creation
and ﬁxed asset investment in travel to work areas that had higher cluster of Eastern
European workers ex-ante. However, the eﬀects on wages are still insigniﬁcant.23.
1.6 Cultural proximity and social ties or changes in worker's skill-
mix
In this section I explore the potential mechanisms behind the eﬀects on existing ﬁrm
investment and ﬁrm creation. Are the changes in investment and number of employees at
the ﬁrm level related to social ties between ﬁrm directors and the immigrants? If cultural
or social factors play an important role in the decision to invest, it should be the case
that ﬁrms with EU8 directors beneﬁt more from the immigration policy change.24 To
test this hypothesis, I collect data on the nationalities of directors for all ﬁrms registered
in the United Kingdom. I deﬁne EU8 majority ﬁrms as those in which at least half of
the directors in the board are from Eastern European origin as of 2001. The advantage
of using data from 2001 is that the board composition is less likely to be aﬀected by the
immigration policy. The results are similar if I use contemporaneous board composition.
22There are 9 regions in England.
23See appendix for the regressions under this level of aggregation
24Munshi (2003) shows that networks play an important role in worker earnings. More recently,
Burchardi and Hassan (2013) and Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan (2016) showed that social ties and
migration may be related to more entrepreneurship and investment.
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First, I test whether existing ﬁrms with a majority of EU8 directors invest more. I
estimate the following equation:
ln(yit) = αi + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt+
+ β3EU8Firmi ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β4EU8Firmi ∗ PostImplementt+
+ β5FractionEasternd ∗ EU8Firmi ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β6FractionEasternd ∗ EU8Firmi ∗ PostImplementt + εdt.
The coeﬃcients of interest in this setting are β5 and β6. They represent the triple
interaction of a ﬁrm with a majority of EU8 directors ex ante, a ﬁrm located in a district
with high immigration exposure ex ante, and the policy change.
Table 1.8 shows the within-ﬁrm regressions. I only report the relevant coeﬃcients.
Although the results are not signiﬁcant, investment for EU8-directed ﬁrms in ﬁxed assets
decreases. Employment results are positive, but they are also not statistically signiﬁcant.
On aggregate, this channel does not explain either ﬁxed asset investment or employment
decisions.
On the other hand, I can test whether EU8 directors are more likely to create ﬁrms
after the policy change. I test whether the proportion of ﬁrms created by EU8 majority
ﬁrms increases as a proportion of the total. First, both EU8 majority ﬁrm creation and
UK majority ﬁrm creation increase. However, EU8 ﬁrms increase also proportionally to
total ﬁrms in a district after the announcement. I do not have data on the time of arrival
of the directors, but the diﬀerential eﬀects between the new and the existing EU8 ﬁrms
suggest these directors are coming to the United Kingdom.
As discussed by Lewis (2011, 2013), the increase in investment depends on the skill
composition of the labor supply shock. Furthermore, from Manacorda, Manning and
Wadsworth (2012) there is evidence that immigration to the United Kingdom is predom-
inantly high-skill. High-skill labor is more likely to complement capital. Moreover, an
increase in the inﬂow of high-skill labor can also explain the signiﬁcant increase in the
incorporation of knowledge ﬁrms.
In this section, I use district aggregate data to provide evidence of two patterns in the
data. First, the log odds of high-skill over low-skill labor immigrants in relation to the
same ratio for British workers is negatively correlated with ex ante immigration in the
cross section. The log odds ratio measure selection and sorting since Roy (1951 ).25 This
25For an application, see Grogger and Hanson (2011).
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implies immigrants positively sort into districts with higher ex ante immigration. Second,
the change in the log odds of immigration by high- to low-skill workers before and after
the policy is positively correlated to the immigration exposure measure. This implies
that the policy changed the skill distribution of immigrants toward high-skill labor.
To measure the proportion of Eastern European workers within a district, I rely on
census data. These data are provided for 2001 and for 2011. Skill in this setting is
only measured by educational attainment. High-skill workers are those with at least
a higher national diploma in the United Kingdom. Low-skill workers are those with
no qualiﬁcations. Table 1.11 shows the ex ante negative selection of Eastern European
immigrants compared to British workers. The log adds positively change when compared
with the 2011 census data. These results suggest an improvement in the selection of new
immigrants to districts that were ex ante more exposed.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper suggests a causal link between immigration, ﬁrm creation, and ﬁxed capital
investment. To identify the relationship between immigration and investment, I rely on a
modiﬁed version of the shift-share measures used in the labor literature. I combine the ex
ante clusters of immigrants from the same nationalities with a natural experiment: the
modiﬁcation in immigration policy by the United Kingdom triggered by the expansion of
the European Union. This time variation allows me to control for local economic shocks
and, therefore, reduces the concerns of endogeneity.
My results suggest ﬁrms responses to immigration occur in anticipation of future
labor ﬂows after the policy implementation. Once the EU announced its expansion, ﬁrm
creation in districts with a high ex ante proportion of workers increased signiﬁcantly.
For pre-existing ﬁrms, the adjustments are diﬀerent. I document a permanent increase in
ﬁxed capital and total asset investment only for the construction sector. I ﬁnd no evidence
that the average ﬁrm-level remuneration changes after the change in immigration policy
in any sector.
I document results consistent with an increase of competition in the sectors in which
adjustment occurs through the incorporation of new ﬁrms. For the service and the knowl-
edge sectors, the increase in the number of ﬁrms came at the expense of existing ﬁrms.
Firms are smaller in terms of total assets. I ﬁnd no evidence that this adjustment af-
fects the average worker. I do ﬁnd evidence that it decreases the compensation of the
highest-paid directors at ﬁrms in industries where the number of ﬁrms increases.
I also explore the channels through which the adjustment happens. EU8 nationals
create more ﬁrms as a proportion of all ﬁrms created in districts more exposed to the
change in immigration policy. On the other hand, existing ﬁrms with EU8 majority
boards do not increase investment in ﬁxed assets. This implies that the increase in
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EU8 ﬁrm creation is more likely caused by new immigrants rather than ﬁrms employing
existing immigrants. Furthermore, investment is not determined by previously existing
ties.
On the other hand, I ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that immigration changes the
labor skill composition. I ﬁnd correlations that suggest that, after the open border policy,
the skill selection of immigrants signiﬁcantly improved. Furthermore, the increase in ﬁrm
creation concentrates in sectors that rely on human capital, the knowledge sector, or that
rely on labor intensive tasks, the service sector. Finally, the only wage eﬀects I ﬁnd are
concentrated on the remuneration of the highest-paid directors in the service and in the
knowledge sectors.
My results are economically relevant for the UKs immigration policy. Corporate
investment increases in anticipation of immigration labor supply even in the short-term.
Moreover, immigration also increases the number of ﬁrms created in sectors that rely on
human capital. Evidence in the United Kingdom points to adjustments through factor
investments and the creation of new ﬁrms, rather than through factor.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Timeline of immigration decisions by diﬀerent EU members
This ﬁgure summarizes the years in which European countries which are already members of the EU
open their labor markets to nationals from the newly admitted countries. Opening refers to allowing
nationals from those countries to work without a Visa or sponsorship application process.
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Figure 1.2: New registrations from EU8 and EU15
NINO is an abbreviation for National Insurance Number. EU8 refers to countries admitted to the EU
in 2004. EU15 are countries that already belonged to the EU by 2004.
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Figure 1.3: New registrations from EU8 and non-EU Eastern Europe
NINO is an abbreviation for National Insurance Number. EU8 refers to countries admitted to the EU
in 2004. Non admitted EU are Bulgaria and Romania. These are European countries that were not
part of the EU by 2004 and were also not incorporated in the expansion. They were incorporated in
the next expansion, but obtained labor rights within the UK in 2014.
Figure 1.4: Quarterly new registrations of nationals from countries admitted in 2004
I rank the districts according to the shares of pre-existing workers share of workers from Eastern
Europe. I then assign each district to a quartile.
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Figure 1.5: New ﬁrms incorporated per quarter
I rank the districts according to the shares of pre-existing workers share of workers from Eastern
Europe. I then assign each district to a quartile.
40
Figure 1.6: Estimation of regression coeﬃcients pre and post Policy
Coeﬃcient estimates of each variable of interest on an interaction between ex ante immigration and a
dummy variable. 95% conﬁdence intervals reported in red. The vertical lines represent the open policy
announcement and implementation.
(a) Share of new EU8 registrations
(b) Logarithm of total new ﬁrms created in a district
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Figure 1.2: Regression estimates of pre-treatment trends within ﬁrms
Coeﬃcient estimates of each variable of interest on an interaction between ex ante immigration and a
dummy variable. 95% conﬁdence intervals reported in red. The vertical lines represent the open policy
announcement and implementation. For ﬁrm-level data I have only two periods before the
announcement. Therefore, there is only one coeﬃcient estimate before the announcement.
(a) Logarithm Fixed assets (b) Logarithm Employees
(c) Logarithm Sales (d) Logarithm Average Remuneration
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: District-level summary statistics for Immigration and Labor Data
All data are from the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). New registrations refer to new
national insurance numbers issued to incoming workers of all nationalities. EU8 refers to nationals from
countries admitted to the EU in 2004. EU15 refers to nationals from countries that belonged to the
EU before the 2004 expansion. The new countries admitted to EU in 2007 refer to Bulgaria and Romania.
Pre EU8 admission
(2002-2003)
Post EU8 admission
(2004-2007)
New registrations 842.9
(1510.1)
1556.3
(2,471.7)
New registrations EU8 34.3
(98.5)
572.1
(829.8)
New registrations EU15 177.6
(330.8)
236.9
(480.3)
New registrations new to EU 2007 15.8
(48.7)
32.53
(144.8)
New registrations per ex ante
workers (%)
0.93%
(1.31%)
1.82%
(2.13%)
EU8 new registrations per ex ante
workers (%)
0.04%
(0.09%)
0.73%
(0.81%)
EU15 new registrations per ex ante
workers (%)
0.21%
(0.32%)
0.27%
(0.47%)
New to EU 2007 per ex ante
workers (%)
0.02%
(0.04%)
0.04%
(0.14%)
Activity Rate (%) 79.85%
(5.47%)
78.19%
(4.85%)
Workers 72,807
(46,892)
75,659
(49,757.1)
Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev)
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Table 1.2: Firm-level summary statistics on board composition. Firms incorporated
before 2000
All data are from BvD's Orbis and Fame databases. UK directors are directors with British nationality.
EU15 includes directors with a nationality from any of the countries that were members of the European
Union before 2004, excluding the UK. EU8 includes nationals from the countries admitted to the
European Union in the 2004 expansion.
Year %Directors from
UK
%Directors from
EU countries
admitted
pre-2004 (EU15)
%Directors from
EU countries
admitted in
2004 (EU8)
Number of ﬁrms
2000 90.1%
(29.9%)
4.4%
(20.6%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
771,625
2001 91%
(28.6%)
4.5%
(20.7%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
702,960
2002 91.5%
(27.9%)
4.4%
(20.6%)
0.07%
(2.7%
634,613
2003 91.7%
(27.6%)
4.4%
(20.5%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
584,909
2004 91.8%
(27.4%)
4.4%
(20.5%)
0.07%
(2.7%)
549,130
2005 91.9%
(27.3%)
4.5%
(20.6%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
520,854
2006 91.9%
(27.3%)
4.5%
(20.7%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
500,311
2007 92%
(27.1%)
4.6%
(20.9%)
0.08%
(2.8%)
484,098
2008 92%
(27.2%)
4.7%
(21.1%)
0.08%
(2.9%)
468,542
Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev)
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Table 1.3: Firm-level summary statistics on board composition for ﬁrms by year of in-
corporation
All data are from BvD's Orbis and Fame databases. The UK directors are those British nationality.
EU15 includes directors with a nationality from any of the countries that were members of the European
Union before 2004, excluding the UK. EU8 includes nationals from the countries admitted to the
European Union in the 2004 expansion.
Incorporation %Directors from
UK
%Directors from
EU countries
admitted
pre-2004 (EU15)
%Directors from
EU countries
admitted in 2004
(EU8)
Number of
ﬁrms
2000 83.5%
(37.1%)
4.6%
(20.9%)
0.1%
(3.2%)
123,487
2001 80.9%
(39.3%)
4.6%
(21%)
0.1%
(3.2%)
124,395
2002 82%
(38.4%)
4.7%
(21.1%)
0.14%
(3.7%)
199,048
2003 80.7%
(39.5%)
5%
(21.7%)
0.26%
(5.1%)
283,884
2004 76.1%
(42.6%)
8%
(27.1%)
0.36%
(6%)
250,750
2005 72.8%
(44.5%)
9.5%
(29.3%)
0.55%
(7.4%)
272,563
2006 72.3%
(44.7%)
9.6%
(29.5%)
0.74%
8.6%
306,941
2007 73.9%
(43.9%)
7.3%
(26%)
0.93%
(9.6%)
363,816
2008 76.2%
(42.6%)
7.7%
(26.7%)
0.96%
(9.8%)
290,796
Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev)
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Table 1.4: Firm-level summary statistics on ﬁxed assets for ﬁrms that had at least one employee over the sample
data are from ORBIS and Fame Databases. All numbers are in thousands except employees and number of ﬁrms. Number of ﬁrms refers to ﬁrms that have
data at least on ﬁxed assets. All nominal values are in pounds sterling.
Year Fixed assets Total employee
remuneration
Total directors
remuneration
Number of
employees
Average
employee
remuneration
Remuneration
highest paid
director
Number of ﬁrms
2001 497.4
(6,392.7)
487.7
(1,639.7)
289
(688.3)
243
(2,955)
17.4
(38.8)
243.8
(494)
86,788
2002 489.6
(6,753.4)
488.8
(1,357.9)
294.3
(674.5)
243
(2,968)
17.7
(37)
249.7
(463.2)
86,597
2003 476.6
(6,902.1)
494.6
(2,836.8)
305.5
(786.4)
250
(3,091)
17.8
(37.2)
258.3
(659)
86,478
2004 460.2
(3,803.7)
458.8
(1,081.9)
333.7
(891.9)
264
(3,381)
18
(39.8)
260.1
(775.3)
85,104
2005 474.5
(3,916.1)
484.3
(1,131.9)
371.9
(1,062.2)
310
(3,999)
19.3
(43)
268.6
(744.3)
55,889
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
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Table 1.5: Allocation of EU8 new registrations at a quarterly frequency
FractionEastern refers to the fraction of workers from the EU8 plus Bulgaria and Romania as of the
2001 census. PostAnnounce is an indicator variable with value one after the announcement of the EU
expansion in the second quarter of 2003. PostImplement is an indicator variable with value one after
the implementation of the open border policy in the second quarter of 2004. All standard errors are
clustered at the district level. Area refers to NUTS2 statistical areas that cover all England.
Panel A: Continuous Exposure Measure
ShareNewRegisteredWorkersEU8dt
FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet 0.005***
(0.001)
FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt 0.07***
(0.007)
AdjR2 0.8275
District FE Yes
Area*Quarter FE Yes
N 7,704
Panel B: Dummy Exposure Measure
ShareNewRegisteredWorkersEU8dt
HighFractionEast8d ∗ PostAnnouncet 0.0000422***
(6.81e-06)
HighFractionEast8d ∗ PostImplementt 0.00146***
(0.00015)
AdjR2 0.7094
District FE Yes
Area*Quarter FE Yes
N 7,704
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Table 1.6: District-level regressions
FraEast refers to the fraction of workers from the EU8 plus Bulgaria and Romania as of the 2001 census.
Ann is an indicator variable with value one after the announcement of the EU expansion in the second
quarter of 2003. Imp is an indicator variable with value one after the implementation of the open border
policy in the second quarter of 2004. All standard errors are clustered at the district level. All regressions
use district ﬁxed eﬀects and area-time dummies. Fixed assets refer to the average ﬁrm ﬁxed assets that
existed in the district. Mean wage is obtained directly from the census data. The district level results
are similar if I use the average employee remuneration from the FAME ﬁrm-level data.
Panel A: District-Level Regressions Announcement and Implementation
Quarterly Yearly
ln(Firms) ln(FixedAssets) ln(FixedAssetsNew) ln(MeanWages)
FraEast*Ann 0.84** 0.88* 0.64 -0.25
(0.40) (0.49) (11.25) (0.20)
FraEast*Imp 1.41*** -0.52 -1.18 -0.01
(0.53) (0.64) (0.85) (0.14)
N 7661 1595 1595 1585
Adj R2 0.95 0.93 0.52 0.96
Panel B: First stage policy and announcement combined
NewEU8/L NewEU8/L
FraEast*Ann 0.05*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.20***
(0.006) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N 4644 1147 1147 1585
F 75.95 109.76 109.76 143.02
Panel C: Reduced form policy and announcement combined
ln(Firms) ln(FixedAssets) ln(FixedAssetsNew) ln(MeanWages)
FraEast*Ann 1.67** 0.82 -0.31 -0.26
(0.71) (0.62) (1.11) (0.22)
N 4644 1147 1147 1585
Adj R2 0.96 0.91 0.57 0.96
Panel D: IV
ln(Firms) ln(FixedAssets) ln(FixedAssetsNew) ln(Wages)
NewEU8/L 32.3** 5.07 -1.93 -1.31
(13.07) (3.94) (6.93) (1.09)
N 4644 1147 1147 1585
Centered R2 0.97 0.94 0.74 0.97
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Table 1.7: Firm-level regressions, ﬁrms incorporated before 2001
FraEast fraction of workers from the EU8 plus Bulgaria and Romania as of the 2001 census. Ann is an indicator variable with value one after the announcement
of the EU expansion. Imp is an indicator variable with value one after the implementation of the open border policy. WorkRem is the average employee
remuneration in the ﬁrm. DirRem is the remuneration of the highest paid director. NewEU8/L is the fraction of new EU8 registrations over 2001. Sales/L
is total revenue per worker. K/L is ﬁxed assets per employee. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All regressions use ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and
area-time dummies.
Panel A: Firm-level regressions announcement and implementation
Factor Remunera-
tion
Productivity Factor Adjustments
ln(WorkRem) ln(DirRem) ln(Sales/L) ln(TotalAssets) ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(K/L)
FraEast*Ann 0.12 0.29 0.39** -0.24 0.47** -0.11 0.20
(0.14) (0.30) (0.17) (0.29) (0.23) (0.12) (0.22)
FraEast*Imp -0.01 -0.34 -0.10 0.03 0.00 0.36** -0.68**
(0.12) (0.25) (0.23) (0.32) (0.29) (0.11) (0.34)
N 269557 72444 216779 415518 351898 299847 269557
Adj R2 0.98 0.85 0.97 0.85 0.93 0.96 0.95
Panel B: Reduced form announcement and implementation combined
ln(WorkRem) ln(DirRem) ln(Sales/L) ln(TotalAssets) ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(K/L)
FraEast*Ann 0.09 -0.14 0.34 -0.49 0.32 0.02 -0.19
(0.18) (0.27) 0.23 (0.35) (0.32) (0.13) (0.27)
N 195362 55153 156546 314628 263638 217446 192206
Adj R2 0.99 0.87 0.98 0.88 0.94 0.96 0.96
Panel C: IV announcement and implementation combined
ln(WorkRem) ln(DirRem) ln(Sales/L) ln(TotalAssets) ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(K/L)
NewEU8/L 0.79 -1.17 3.04 -3.94 2.61 0.17 -1.75
(1.56) (2.25) (1.92) 2.69 (2.68) (1.21) (2.45)
N 195362 55153 156546 314628 263638 299847 192206
Centered R2 0.99 0.92 0.98 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.97
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Table 1.8: Cultural proximity or new entrepreneurs
All standard errors are clustered at the district level. FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from
EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. Ann is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after 2003,
the year the EU expansion was announced. Imp is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after the EU
expansion was implemented. EU8 Firms refer to ﬁrms with a majority of members with a EU8 nationality.
Panel A: Diﬀerential eﬀects ﬁrms with EU8 boards
ln(FixAssets) ln(Employees) ln(K/L)
FrEast*EU8Firm*Announcement 0.06 0.19 (0.41)
(1.49) (0.87) (1.46)
FrEast*EU8Firm*Implementation -0.87 0.79 -0.95
(1.51) (0.59) (1.54)
Interactions Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Area*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.94 0.96 0.96
N 351898 299847 265694
Panel B: New ﬁrms board nationalities
ln(UKFirms) ln(EU8FIrms) %EU8Firms
FrEast*Announcement 1.36*** 1.14 0.043***
(0.48) (1.72) (0.01)
FrEast*Implementation 0.46 2.25 0.00
(0.40) (2.33) (0.01)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Area*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.96 0.62 0.13
N 7661 1196 7657
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Table 1.9: Intensive margin ﬁrm-level results by economic sector
All standard errors are clustered at the district level. All regressions include a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and a year*area dummy. FraEast refers to the proportion of
workers from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. Ann is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after 2003, the year the EU expansion was announced. Imp
is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after the EU expansion was implemented. NewEu8/L refers to new registrations from EU8 divided by the total num-
ber of workers in 2001. The sectors are knowledge, construction and services. For more information about the construction of these sectors refer to the appendix.
Panel A: Firm Level Regressions Announcement and Implementation
ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(TotalAssets) ln(WorkRem.) ln(Dir.Rem.)
FrEast*Ann 0.47 0.99 2.68*** 0.19 -0.44 -0.34 -0.49 2.40* -0.97 0.14 0.26 -0.52 -0.17 0.93 -1.45
(0.68) (0.69) (0.75) (0.27) (0.34) (0.36) (0.76) 1.25 (0.90) (0.52) (0.41) (0.51) (1.14) (0.80) (1.23)
FrEast*Imp 0.03 0.85 0.38 0.11 0.39 0.79 0.52 -0.14 -1.14 -0.60 0.21 0.55 -1.68 0.26 -2.37**
(0.70) (0.62) (1.02) (0.27) (0.45) (0.50) (0.74) (0.77) (1.13) 0.42 (0.54) (0.54) (0.89) (0.99) (1.18)
N 42855 27583 24388 36869 22164 20488 51542 31870 30619 31977 19415 17855 7948 6562 3786
Adj R2 0.91 0.93 0.9 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.84 0.86 0.79 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.9 0.87 0.89
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
Panel B: Reduced form policy and announcement combined
ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(TotalAssets) ln(WorkRem.) ln(Dir.Rem.)
FrEast*Ann 0.52 1.26** 1.14 0.11 -0.40 0.18 -0.95 2.46* -1.55* -0.24 0.14 -0.76 -1.50 0.55 -1.48
(0.79) (0.61) (1.26) (0.33) (0.37) (0.44) (0.78) 1.45 (0.91) (0.48) (0.39) (0.62) (1.18) (0.99) (1.63)
N 32390 20853 18450 26981 16104 14889 39325 24207 23358 23461 14067 12979 6330 5117 2960
Adj R2 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.91 0.89 0.89
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
Panel C: IV
ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(TotalAssets) ln(WorkRem.) ln(Dir.Rem.)
NewEU8/L 4.52 10.11* 10.25 1.09 -3.69 1.74 -8.04 19.13 -13.72* -2.20 1.29 -7.28 -12.82 5.10 -11.79
(6.91) (5.28) (11.90) (3.10) (3.40) (4.20) 6.66 11.83 (8.09) (4.49) (3.71) (6.32) (10.13) (9.08) (12.77)
N 32390 20853 18450 26981 16104 14889 39325 24207 23358 23461 14067 12979 6330 5117 2960
Centered R2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.93
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
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Table 1.10: District-level ﬁrm creation regressions by economic sector
All standard errors are clustered at the district level. FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from
EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. Ann is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after 2003,
the year the EU expansion was announced. Imp is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after the
EU expansion was implemented. NewEu8/L refers to new registrations from EU8 divided by the total
number of workers in 2001. The sectors are knowledge, construction and services. For more information
about the construction of these sectors refer to the appendix. EU8 ﬁrms refer to ﬁrms with a majority
of EU8 national in the boards at the moment of incorporation.
Panel A: District-Level Regressions Announcement and Imple-
mentation
ln(Firms) ln(EU8Firms)
FraEast*Ann 0.20 -1.15 0.48 -0.88 2.38 -1.28
(0.89) (0.89) (0.81) (1.46) (1.65) (1.40)
FraEast*Imp 0.33 2.24** 1.98 1.72 -1.27 -0.05
(0.71) (0.91) 1.08 (1.70) (1.78) (1.52)
N 1914 1909 1912 1839 1793 1819
Adj R2 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.82 0.75 0.82
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
Panel B: Reduced form policy and announcement combined
ln(Firms) ln(EU8Firms)
FraEast*Ann 1.62** 0.82 2.04** 0.58 1.89 -1.14
(0.81) (0.93) (0.99) (1.39) (1.69) (1.24)
N 1594 1592 1593 1535 1506 1520
Adj R2 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.82 0.77 0.82
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
Panel C: IV
ln(Firms) ln(EU8Firms)
NewEU8/L 7.32** 3.72 9.22** 2.79 8.58 -5.27
(3.60) (4.06) (4.52) (6.66) (7.51) (5.69)
N 1594 1592 1593 1535 1506 1520
Centered R2 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.87
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
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Table 1.11: Selection of migrants
FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. The ﬁrst two regressions are cross-sectional. The last regression
measures the change between 2011 and 2001 and can be interpreted as accounting for a district ﬁxed eﬀect. All regressions control for the NUTS2 Areas.
ln(OddsEU8)-ln(OddsUK) ln(OddsEU8)-ln(OddsUK) ln(OddsEU8)-ln(OddsUK)
FrEast -7.58*** -1.79 5.79***
(1.28) (1.68) (1.85)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes
Census Year 2001 2011 Change
Adj R2 0.94 0.96 0.96
N 323 323 323
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Appendix
Table 1.A.1: Most frequent industries by ﬁrms incorporated in 2001
NACE Industry Name Incorporated
2001
% Over To-
tal 2001
Incorporated
2006
% Over To-
tal 2006
8299 Other business sup-
port activities
22,302 16.9 51,634 21.72
7022 Business and other
management con-
sulting activities
7,380 5.59 12,003 5.05
6209 Other Information
technology and
computer service
activities
6,847 5.19 8,751 3.68
6920 Accounting book-
keeping and auditing
activities; tax con-
sultancy
3,704 2.81 2,945 1.24
6820 Renting and operat-
ing of own or leased
real state
3,626 2.75 4,345 1.83
4110 Development of
building projects
3,540 2.68 6,826 2.87
4120 Construction of
buildings
3,345 2.53 6,025 2.53
9609 Other personal ser-
vice activities
3,193 2.42 6,342 2.67
6202 Computer consul-
tancy activities
2,695 2.04 6,913 2.91
5829 Other software pub-
lishing
2,512 1.9 494 0.21
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Table 1.A.2: EU8 ﬁrm creation in top 10 industries
NACE Industry Name Incorporated
by EU8
board 2001
% Over
EU8
2001
Incorporated
by EU8
board 2001
% Over
EU8
2006
% In-
crease
8299 Other business
support activities
21 21.88 250 16.93 10.90
7022 Business and
other manage-
ment consulting
activities
2 2.08 30 2.03 14.00
6209 Other Informa-
tion technology
and computer
service activities
3 3.13 25 1.69 7.33
6920 Accounting book-
keeping and au-
diting activities;
tax consultancy
2 2.08 13 0.88 5.50
6820 Renting and op-
erating of own or
leased real state
1 1.04 3 0.2 2.00
4110 Development of
building projects
2 2.08 22 1.49 10.00
4120 Construction of
buildings
3 3.13 94 6.36 30.33
9609 Other personal
service activities
4 4.17 80 5.42 19.00
6202 Computer con-
sultancy activi-
ties
1 1.04 36 2.44 35.00
5829 Other software
publishing
0 0 1 0.07 NA
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Table 1.A.3: Industries classiﬁed as knowledge sector
NACE Code Industry
5821 Publishing of Computer Games
5829 Other Software Publishing
6110 Wired telecommunications activities
6120 Wireless telecommunications activities
6130 Satellite telecommunications activities
6190 Other telecommunications activities
6201 Computer programming activities
6202 Computer consultancy activities
6203 Computer facilities management activities
6209 Other information technology and computer service ac-
tivities
6311 Data processing, hosting and related activities
6312 Web portals
7022 Business and other management consulting activities
7111 Architectural activities
7112 Engineering activities and related technical consultant
7120 Technical testing and analysis
7211 Research and experimental development on biotechnol-
ogy
7219 Other research and experimental development on natu-
ral sciences and engineering
7220 Research and experimental development on social sci-
ences and humanities
7410 Specialised design activities
7420 Photographic activities
7490 Other professional, scientiﬁc and technical activities
n.e.c.
7500 Veterinary activities
8510 Pre-primaryeducation
8520 Primary education
8531 General secondary educatio
8532 Technical and vocational secondary education
8541 Post-secondary non-tertiary education
8542 Tertiary education
8560 Educational support activities
8610 Hospital activities
8621 General medical practice activities
8622 Specialist medical practice activities
8623 Dental practice activities
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Table 1.A.4: Industries classiﬁed as construction sector
NACE Code Industry
4110 Development of building projects
4120 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings
4211 Construction of roads and motorways
4212 Construction of railways and underground railways
4213 Construction of bridges and tunnels
4221 Construction of utility projects for ﬂuids
4222 Construction of utility projects for electricity and telecommunications
4291 Construction of water projects
4299 Construction of other civil engineering projects n.e.c.
4311 Demolition
4312 Site preparation
4313 Test drilling and boring
4321 Electrical installation
4322 Plumbing, heat and air conditioning installation
4329 Other construction installation
4331 Plastering
4332 Joinery installation
4333 Floor and wall covering
4334 Painting and glazing
4339 Other building completion and ﬁnishing
4391 Rooﬁng activities
4399 Other specialised construction activities n.e.c.
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Table 1.A.5: Industries classiﬁed as service sector
NACE Code Industry
5610 Restaurants and mobile food service activities
5621 Event catering activities
5629 Other food service activities
5630 Beverage service activities
8299 Other business support activities
9700 Activities of households as domestic personnel
Table 1.A.6: Firm Destruction
FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. All regression
control for district and area*time ﬁxed eﬀects. The hazard rate is computed as the proportion of created
ﬁrms that are destroyed the following year.
Destruction/L HazardRate(1 year)
FrEast*Ann 0.02 0.001
(0.03) (0.001)
FrEast*Imp -0.08 0.001
(0.06) (0.001)
N 2233 2560
Adj R2 -0.02 0.03
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Table 1.A.7: Reduced Form Regressions at the Travel to Work Area Level
FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. At the
extensive margin (ﬁrm creation) the regression controls for travel to work area ﬁxed eﬀects and for
region*time ﬁxed eﬀects. At the intensive margin (ﬁxed capital investment and wages) the regression
controls for company ﬁxed eﬀects and region*time dummies.
Panel A: Regressions Annnoucement and Implementation
Ln(Firms) Ln(FixedAssets) Ln(AverageWage)
FrEast*Ann 1.98 0.56*** 0.11
(1.23) (0.21) (0.16)
FrEast*Imp 1.7 0.01 0.18
(1.33) (0.22) (0.15)
N 3360 351898 205129
Adj R2 0.93 0.93 0.97
Panel B: Reduced Form Annnoucement
Ln(Firms) Ln(FixedAssets) Ln(AverageWage)
FrEast*Ann 5.55** 0.45** 0.1
(2.4) (0.2) (0.001)
N 2130 263638 2560
Adj R2 0.94 0.94 0.03
Frequency Quarterly Yearly Yearly
Aggregation Travel To Work Areas (TTWA)
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2 The impact of the Mexican Drug War on trade
Jesus Gorrin, Jose Morales, and Bernardo Ricca
2.1 Introduction
From 2007 to 2011, the homicide rate in Mexico almost tripled, reaching 22.6 murders
per 100 thousand people in 2011. This severe growth in violence has been causally linked
to the Mexican Drug War (Dell, 2015).26 In tandem, and despite a set of liberalizing
economic reforms that started in the mid-nineties, Mexican economic performance has
been rather disappointing.27 The compounded average growth rate of GDP per capita in
Mexico between 2006 and 2011 was approximately 0.6%, below its Latin American peers.
Can violence sparked by the Mexican Drug War explain Mexico's missing opportunities?
If so, what is the main channel through which violence generates negative economic
eﬀects? The answers to these questions provide valuable lessons for the role of anti-
drug and anti-crime policies in developing economies, the role of violence in hampering
economic opportunities in developing economies (especially in Latin America), and the
limits of economic reform in areas suﬀering from chronic violence.
In this paper, we study whether this sharp increase in violence and economic under-
performance are causally connected. Crime and violence can distort economic decisions
and alter outcomes through diﬀerent mechanisms. Firms incur in insurance and protec-
tion costs against perceived threats. Violence can aﬀect workers' productivity through
increased levels absenteeism and stress. Fighting crime draws scarce public resources
away from alternative, productive uses by national and local governments. Violence af-
fects the location decisions of ﬁrms and workers. Both anecdotal and academic evidence
suggests large negative economic impacts from violence, especially in regions with high
levels of crime, such as Latin America.28 Yet there is little evidence about the operation
of speciﬁc mechanisms through which crime and violence aﬀect economic decisions.
A clear challenge to the existing literature is the endogeneity problem: crime is cor-
related with a wide range of local non-observable economic variables that aﬀect ﬁrms'
prospects. This limits the internal validity of cross-country or cross-state regressions.
Another issue is measurement error due to underreporting, which can cause signiﬁcant
biases, since underreporting is correlated with regional characteristics.29
For several reasons, the Mexican Drug War is an interesting setting to assess the eco-
26In Dell (2015) part of that increase in violence comes from a change in drug-traﬃcking routes, which
decreases the eﬃcacy of the policy and generates external eﬀects on areas that were less exposed to
drug-traﬃcking related violence before.
27For a discussion on the constraints to productivity and growth in Mexico, see Levy (2018).
28See Soares and Naritomi (2010) for an overview.
29Soares (2004) shows that crime reporting, measured as the fraction of the total number of crimes that
is actually reported, is correlated with institutional stability, police presence and perceived corruption.
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nomic consequences of crime. Firstly, the increase in violence after the Drug War was
large. Secondly, data from surveys indicate that ﬁrms were severely aﬀected. For in-
stance, according to the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the percentage of establishments
paying for security increased from 41.5% in 2006 to 59% in 2010, and the percentage of
establishments that experienced losses as a result of theft, robbery or vandalism doubled
in the same period (from 15% to 30%). Thirdly, the war was mainly led by one political
party - the the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN ). The deployment
of law enforcement tends to be correlated with trends in violence. But, as proposed by
Dell (2015), the fact that the PAN led the war allows us to employ an empirical strategy
that uses close municipal elections as a source of exogenous variation in the intensity of
the ﬁght against drugs.
Dell (2015) shows that homicides increase sharply after close elections of PAN mayors.
Since in close elections a PAN win is as good as randomly assigned and has a clear eﬀect
on homicides, it is a candidate for an instrumental variable for the eﬀect of homicides
on the economy. The remaining condition to be satisﬁed is the exclusion restriction: the
instrument should aﬀect the outcome of interest only through its eﬀect on homicides.
This is unlikely to be the case. Firstly, new incumbents from the PAN might imple-
ment policies that aﬀect the business environment. Secondly, the increase in violence was
probably not restricted to homicides - the incidence of other crimes that hinder the busi-
ness environment, such as robbery, kidnappings and extortion, could also have increased.
Thirdly, since the Mexican president throughout the period studied is also from the PAN
party, municipalities governed by PAN mayors may also receive more support from the
federal government.30 Finally, there may be spillovers to the control group. Therefore, a
reduced-from form regression of an economic outcome on close PAN victories cannot be
interpreted directly as the eﬀect of the Drug War. It should be interpreted as the eﬀect
of a PAN election. An instrumental variable strategy that uses close PAN wins as an
instrument for homicides would provide biased results.
Nevertheless, because of the features of Mexico's institutional setting, we still can
learn about the unintended consequence of the Mexican Drug War on the economy. In the
absence of the Drug War, PAN municipalities were likely to receive an economic beneﬁt.
The PAN party is deemed a more market-friendly party. The federal administration is
likely to beneﬁt PAN municipalities, since they belong to the same party. Spillovers to
the control group attenuate the eﬀects. All these biases underestimate the hypothesized
negative eﬀects of crime and violence on the economy. We exploit the combination of
factors that should beneﬁt municipalities after an election with tougher anti-drug policies
because of the mayor's aﬃliation. We argue, therefore, that our estimates provide a lower
bound to the economic impact of the Drug War.
30Azulai (2017) shows, in the context of Brazil, that partisan connections distorts the allocation of
public goods.
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We focus our analysis on trade, using both municipal and ﬁrm level data. Exports
are an important part of the Mexican economy and they are a good measure of economic
activity at the local level.31 Moreover, exports are less likely to be driven by local demand,
which could be an additional challenge to the validity of our estimates. We directly control
for demand shocks by comparing exports of the same product to the same country of
destination. We ﬁnd evidence that the Mexican Drug War had a negative eﬀect on
trade. Export growth in municipalities governed by PAN decreased by 40%. We run a
placebo test, using the previous local elections, and ﬁnd that the eﬀect on export growth
is not statistically signiﬁcant. We explore the heterogeneity of the eﬀect across product
characteristics and ﬁnd that exports of more complex products are severely aﬀected (65%
decrease). The eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for less complex products.
To ease potential concerns that the negative eﬀects are driven by the party in power,
we exploit potential spillovers across municipalities. We show that municipalities that are
randomly exposed to a neighbor electing a PANmayor experience higher levels of violence.
Moreover, we also show a signiﬁcant decrease in export growth for these municipalities.
Many mechanisms can explain the evidence that violence aﬀects exports growth. One
is that violence harms the business environment. For example, it causes losses and extra
expenses to ﬁrms and drives away skilled workers. Another mechanism is the following:
cartels smuggle part of their products disguised in legal products. Usually they set up
exporting ﬁrms of simple products, such as ﬁsh, vegetables and canned food.32 Our
evidence supports the ﬁrst channel: exports only decrease for more complex products,
and the eﬀect is stronger for countries that are not part of the main smuggling routes.
We also show displacement of workers from municipalities exposed to the Drug War.
Our results are consistent with the general ﬁndings in the literature on the negative
economic eﬀects of crime, violence and political conﬂicts. Pshisva and Suarez (2010) use
ﬁrm-level data in Colombia to analyze the impact of kidnappings on corporate investment.
They show that ﬁrms investment is negatively correlated with kidnappings that target
ﬁrm owners and managers. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) explore the unilateral truce
declared by ETA in 1998. They ﬁnd that stocks of ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant part of their
business in the Basque Country showed a positive relative performance. Besley and
Mueller (2012) ﬁnd a negative relation between killings and house prices in Northern
Ireland. Similarly, Frischtak and Mandel (2012) provide evidence that the paciﬁcation of
favelas caused an increase in house prices in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
We also relate to the literature that covers the eﬀects of the Mexican Drug War,
being the closest Dell (2015), and the mechanism through which the eﬀects might operate:
31The ratio exports/gdp was 30.37% in 2005 (World Bank national accounts data).
32Business Insider UK: Frozen sharks, fake carrots, and catapults: The bizarre ways smugglers like
`El Chapo' Guzmán get drugs across borders. Access: http://uk.businessinsider.com/el-chapo-guzman-
strange-drug-smuggling-methods.
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worker displacement. Consistent with the worker displacement channel, Contreras (2014)
points out that immigration to US cities at the border increased during the war, despite
the fact that immigration to the US as a whole decreased. Robles, Calderón and Magaloni
(2015) document negative eﬀects on labor participation and the proportion of unemployed
in areas aﬀected by increased violence during the Drug War. We also show evidence of
emigration from aﬀected areas, using a diﬀerent source of exogeneous variation than other
papers in the literature.
Our results suggest that policies that actively engage in violence against drug traﬃck-
ing can have important negative unintended consequences for the economy. They seem to
hamper exports of complex products at the local level through a displacement of workers.
2.2 Mexican political landscape and the Drug War
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Mexico experienced a de facto dictatorship
with a single party domination. For 71 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI ) ruled the country. In the nineties, politicians
from diﬀerent parties started winning local elections, and in 2000 Mexico elected the ﬁrst
non-PRI president since 1929. Some analysts suggest that during the PRI rule there
was a tacit agreement between the government and the drug traﬃckers (O'Neil (2009)).
The agreement allowed cartels to operate as long as they complied with some rules. For
example cartels could not cause major disruptions to civilian life. Importantly, violence
was contained. When other parties started winning elections, the relationship was shaken,
as cartels had to negotiate with the new incumbents from other parties. The election
of Vicente Fox (PAN) as president in 2000 triggered some institutional changes. The
competition between the PAN aﬃliated president and politicians from other parties in
the parliament, states and municipalities forced a transfer of power from the presidency
to other branches of government. Executive changes were limited though, since PAN was
outnumbered in congress. It is only on July 2nd, 2006, when Felipe Calderón (PAN) was
elected president, that changes started to intensify. Calderón governed from December
1st 2006, to 30th November 2012. As soon as he took oﬃce, he declared the war on
drugs, sending the army to several provinces. The policy had tragic consequences. The
arrest or assassination of a kingpin can cause a bloody dispute for power. Members from
the same organization or from rival cartels can exploit the weakening of the leadership to
try to gain control of the organization. Once in charge, new leaders have to assert their
authority, in many cases through the use of violence. Cartels also retaliated against the
state, killing politicians, police oﬃcers, and journalists.
During Calder on's administration, the number of homicides increased by 160%, from
10,452 in 2006 to 27,213 in 2011 (Figure 2.1). Total homicides between 2006 and 2011 -
as well as the absolute increase from the total between 2001 and 2005 - are concentrated
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in the northern regions of the country , closer to the US border (Figure 2.2). These are
the regions where the main cartels operate the smuggling of drugs to the US. In reaction
to the crackdown, there is evidence that cartels begun to diversify their activities into
other crimes, such as extortion, human traﬃcking, oil theft, kidnapping and robbery.
The main strategy targeted cartel leaders. We gathered the information of all con-
ﬁrmed deaths and arrests of high ranked members of 9 diﬀerent Mexican cartels. During
the Calderón presidency, we conﬁrm 13 killings and 54 arrests performed by governmental
authorities over 49 Mexican municipalities. These operations were mainly organized at
the federal level, but coordination with municipal police was important.
Municipal presidents, the Mexican equivalent to mayors, are elected by popular vote.
All municipalities and states in Mexico control a police force. The municipality has
the power to remove or appoint the municipal police chief. According to article 115 of
Mexican Constitution, the municipal police has the responsibility to provide security and
prevent crime. The important role of mayor in the implementation of the Drug War
can also be seen in practice. According to ﬁgures from associations that gather majors,
from 2006 until 2014 organized crime killed 63 current or former majors.33 Furthermore,
municipal presidents have denounced extorsion from cartels.34 Hence, municipal elections
are an important source of variation in the way the Drug War policy was implemented
at the local level.
Finally, at the time of the war on drugs Mexico already had competitive election.
Among major parties, PAN is more economically liberal and business oriented than their
national opponents. As evidence of this, PAN was elected on a economic platform based
on globalization and an increase in foreign investment (Krauze (2006)). Its main rival
in the 2006 elections, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución
Democrática, PRD), is suspicious of free markets and globalization. The other rival, the
PRI, is more diverse; however it has an important historical baggage. When in power
PRI was in charge of the nationalization of many industries in the 80's.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
We collect data on local elections results from the Electoral Tribunals of each state.
Local elections are held every three years, and usually elections at diﬀerent states happen
in diﬀerent times. We focus on municipalities with elections in 2007 and 2008 because
the terms of mayors elected in those years started and ﬁnished during Calderón's admin-
istration. Monthly data on homicides are from the National Institute of Geography and
Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI ), and are available since
1990. Data on other types of crimes tend to be noisier due to underreporting. The issue
33Webpage:http://www.24-horas.mx/impunes-63-asesinatos-de-alcaldes-en-mexico/
34Webpage:http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/165947.html
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of underreporting is severe in developing countries, where both the police and victims do
not report all crimes. The most reliable source of crime data at the municipality level is
The National Public Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SNSP).
The system started to publish the data in 2011. Data on municipality characteristics are
from the National System of Municipal Information (Sistema Nacional de Información
Municipal, SNIM ). Data on exports are from the Atlas of Economic Complexity.35
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics of municipalities that held elections in 2007
and 2008. In terms of population, municipalities are small. They have, on average,
35 thousand inhabitants compared to 100 thousand for the average county in the US.
Furthermore, by 2006 Mexico was already a violent country compared to the US. The
American rate of 6 homicides per 100,000 pales with respect to 11.7 in Mexico. How-
ever, compared to some Latin American countries, such as Brazil (26), Colombia (37),
Venezuela (49), and El Salvador (58), Mexico's homicide rate was relatively small in 2006
(Berthet and Lopez (2011)). Although PAN was already an important party, only 0.27
of municipalities had an incumbent PAN mayor. Municipalities that elected PAN may-
ors (treatment group) are richer, less violent and have a higher share of the population
aged between 16 and 29, in comparison to municipalities that did not elect PAN mayors
(control group). However, once the sample is limited to municipalities where PAN won
or lost by a small margin, the baseline characteristics are not statistically diﬀerent in
treatment and control. This result provides evidence the close PAN victories are as good
as randomly assigned. Moreover, the loss of power caused by the restriction of the sam-
ple does not drive the results. For all signiﬁcantly diﬀerent variables in the unrestricted
sample, we see smaller diﬀerences when we restrict to the 5% spread.
We also report the results for the neighbor treatment instrument. There are diﬀerences
in literacy rates and in age. Municipalities neighboring a close PAN win tend to be
older and have a smaller literacy rates. Nonetheless, there are no diﬀerences in years of
schooling, or in economic performance. Moreover, municipalities in this sample are similar
to the average Mexican municipality, which is important for interpreting the results as
the average eﬀect.
Panel A of ﬁgure 2.3 shows the geographical distribution of all municipalities in which
elections took place in 2007 and 2008, while Panel B shows the geographical distribution
of close elections in the same years. In the unconditional sample we can see that, even
when PAN wins are not clustered, the losses are. We also see that PAN loss the majority
of the municipal elections. However, when we restrict to the 5% spread we see that
the distribution of losses and wins are regionally dispersed. This is important for our
identiﬁcation for two reasons. First, this undermines the possibility that regional shocks,
35Webpage: http://complejidad.datos.gob.mx. The Atlas was developed at Harvard's Center for In-
ternational Development. The original data comes from the Tax Administration Service (Servicio de
Administración Tributaria, SAT), Mexican's customs authority.
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and not the treatment, drive our results. Second, it diminishes concerns of spillovers in
control municipalities when restricting to the close elections sample.
2.4 Eﬀect on violence
Usually governments allocate their enforcement arms to regions where violence is
increasing. Therefore a regressions of violence on some measurement of law enforcement
provides biased results. To address this challenge, We identify the eﬀect of violence in
two ways. We follow Dell (2015) and identify the direct eﬀect on violence of electing a
PAN mayor in a close election. We then use a new identiﬁcation strategy. We exploit
spillovers of these elections on neighbor municipalities to show that being close to a
neighbor electing a PAN mayor is enough to cause an increase in violence.
There are two ways in which our modiﬁcation helps with the identiﬁcation. First,
the treatment using neighbors provides more power. Diﬀerently from the relatively small
number of municipalities that experience a close election themselves, there are many
municipalities that have neighbors experiencing a close election. Moreover, having a
neighbor that elected a PAN major in a close election is as good as randomly assigned.
Second, our identiﬁcation diminishes concerns that the eﬀects are driven by particular
policies that mayors adopt in a treated municipality, rather than the spillovers in violence.
As a baseline, we provide results using the same treatment of Dell (2015). Dell (2015)
uses close elections as a source of exogenous variation in the intensity of the war on drugs.
We use the 2007 and 2008 elections in Mexico. The administration of mayors elected in
those years started at the beginning of the war, and ﬁnished around its peak, in 2011.
One party, PAN, pushed for stronger actions on the Mexican drug cartels. As we show
in Table 2.1, and consistent with the evidence found by Dell (2015), for close elections
municipalities are similar among observables. This supports the assumption that close
PAN wins are as good as randomly assigned. Also, PAN wins and losses in close elections
are regionally dispersed, which diminishes concerns of spillovers between the treatment
and control group.
Following Dell (2015), the direct eﬀect speciﬁcation has the form
ym = α + βPANwinm + δf(Marginm, PANwinm) + γXm + m (1)
wherem denotes municipalities, PANwinm is dummy that takes value 1 when PAN wins,
Xm is a vector of municipality controls, and f(Marginm, PANwinm) is a polynomial on
the vote margin and dummy of PAN victory. We restrict the sample to municipalities
where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%.
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows the results of estimation of equation 2 when the outcome
variable is the annual average of homicides over the new incumbent's term. Under the
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standard OLS, the signs are positive, but not signiﬁcant. In this setting a weighted
regression is more appropriate. It is likely that in smaller municipalities crime is under-
reported. The weighted regression addresses the problem of endogeneous sampling. Ide-
ally, we would weight for the inverse of the probability of being sampled (Solon et al.,
2013). We weight for population. When the regressions are weighted by population size
as of 2005, a PAN victory causes a increase between 25 and 41 homicides per 100,000
population. As suggested by Solon et al. (2013), we always report robust standard errors
when weighting.
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that a PAN victory is not associated with any pre-trend
increase in homicides: municipalities where PAN won by a close margin do not experience
higher homicides rates before the election. Panel C analyses the impact on the absolute
change in homicides: before and after the elections. A PAN win is associated with an
increase of 37 in the homicide rate. In Panel D, we use the 2004 and 2005 elections to run
a placebo test. Most of the administration of mayors elected in those elections occurred
before the war. Close PAN wins are not associated with higher homicides over the new
incumbent's term. Therefore, a PAN victory in itself did not cause higher violence at the
municipality level. It seems that the main driver of violence was the combination of PAN
victory with the implementation of the war on drugs.
Table 2.A2 in the Appendix reports the same regressions when we restrict the sample
to municipalities where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 3%. The results are
consistent. Coeﬃcients increase slightly and remain signiﬁcant at 5%. Results are also
similar when we increase the degree of the RD polynomial (Table 2.A3 in the Appendix).
A natural question is whether the incidence of other types of crime also increased.
It could be the case that homicides were concentrated in the war between rival cartels
and the war between state and cartels. In this scenario, other crimes, such as robbery,
kidnapping, and extortion, could remain unchanged. There are some limitations in docu-
menting the eﬀects on other crimes. Data is noisier due to underreporting. Furthermore,
the most reliable source started publishing crime statistics per municipality only in 2011.
Therefore, diﬀerently from homicides where we could test the impact over the whole term,
we can only test the impact on the level observed in 2011, and we cannot run a placebo
test with previous elections. Table 2.A1 in the appendix reports results for six diﬀerent
types of crime. In general, crime increases, but the eﬀects are not always statistically
signiﬁcant. Eﬀects on extortion and robbery are statistically signiﬁcant.
We now focus on our alternative identiﬁcation. We construct a treatment that exploits
the interaction between having a neighbor experiencing a close election and that neighbor
electing a PAN major. We provide two versions of this treatment: having at least on
treated neighbor or population of the treated neighbors. The second version uses the fact
that larger municipalities are more likely to generate spillover eﬀects. The main results
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of this paper are similar when using any of the two versions of the treatment.
The neighbor speciﬁcation has the form (notice the change in subscripts):
ym = α + βPANwinn + δf(Marginn, PANwinn) + γXm + m (2)
where m denotes municipalities and n denotes a neighbor municipality, PANwinn is
dummy that takes value 1 when at least one neighbor elects PAN in a close election and
zero if they elect other parties in close elections, Xm is a vector of municipality controls,
and f(Marginn, PANwinn) is a polynomial on the vote margin and dummy of PAN
victory in neighbor elections. We restrict the sample to municipalities that had at least
one neighbor where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%.
One way to provide intuition for our treatment is by showing the equivalent RDD
graph. The discontinuity is the outcome in the average close election in the neighbor.
Municipalities can have multiple neighbors with close elections. In this paper we restrict
the sample to municipalities that do not have neighbors with mixed treatment. i.e., we
restrict to municipalities that either had all their neighbors with close elections electing
PAN, or all of them electing another party.36
Graph 2.4 shows the cumulative homicides for three years after the relevant municipal
elections. On the "x" axis we show the average diﬀerence in the elections of the neighbors.
Because we lose information when we take the average of the neighbors, it is hard to
ﬁnd signiﬁcance in this graph. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd some evidence of spillovers from
neighboring municipalities. A municipality with neighbors that elect a PAN mayor in a
close election experience more homicides.
Table 2.3 shows the eﬀect of a close PAN win in a neighbor on a municipality. We
show signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects in terms of homicides. From the OLS speciﬁcation we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in homicides both when treatment is a dummy or when it is
the standardized population of PAN close wins in neighbor municipalities. The dummy
instrument shows that having at least one neighbor that elected a PAN mayor in a
close election translates into 11.17 more homicides (per 100 inhabitants) over a period
of three years. Moreover, having a one standard deviation increase in the population of
neighbors electing a PAN mayor translates into a signiﬁcant 3.7 (per 100 inhabitants)
more killings in our municipality. The results are robust when we use the standard OLS
regression. Moreover, for the instrument that accounts for heterogeneous treatment based
on the population of the neighbors, the results are signiﬁcant both in the OLS and in
the weighted regression. When we include polynomial controls for the neighbor margin
the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. However, for the weighted regression coeﬃcients do not
36Results do not depend on this assumption, but this allows us to control for a polynomial using
election margins on the average neighbor. The results are robust if we estimate the regression on a PAN
win neighbor treatment and no sample restrictions
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change.
2.5 Economic consequences
In this section we combine the identiﬁcation based on close municipal elections with
disaggregated municipal and ﬁrm level data. Our focus on exports combined with disag-
gregated data allows us to concentrate on supply eﬀects. This is diﬀerent from the rest of
the literature studying the eﬀects of violence in the economy. Violence could potentially
aﬀect the economy by diminishing the likelihood of individuals to consume or to demand
certain type of goods. Our eﬀect is driven by a drop in the production of goods that are
not aﬀected by local demand shocks.
The municipality-product-destination data allows us to control for demand special-
ization. Regressions on ﬁrm or economic outcomes have the same form as regressions on
homicides (equation 2). When the data is disaggregated, we will also include a set of
dummies to control for foreign demand shocks or for ﬁrm shocks.
Even though the dummy close PAN win is as good as randomly assigned, to draw
conclusions about the actual eﬀects of the Drug War we need to show that the under-
performance was not triggered by the election of PAN itself, but was triggered by propen-
sity to engage in the war on drugs. To approach this question, we provide placebo es-
timates of the same speciﬁcation for the 2004-2005 elections. We show that in previous
PAN wins, there were no negative economic eﬀects.
Moreover, we also use the identiﬁcation based on neighbor electing PAN majors in
close elections and show exports decrease. We also show that the negative economic
eﬀects exists even when the major is not from PAN, but a neighbor is. Making it less
likely for the eﬀects to be caused by other policies that PAN majors implement at the
relevant municipality.
2.5.1 International trade
For several reasons, the main economic variable of interest in this paper is exports.
First, exports are a good measure of economic activity at the local level and they are
important determinants of local level growth. Second, the eﬀect of the close election
can drive both supply and demand. For example, if violence increases in a particular
municipality it could drive workers out of the municipality. If we study local production
instead of exports, then a negative shock could be driven by both a decrease in demand of
those products by local workers and from ﬁrms experiencing a decrease in labor supply. If
we concentrate on exports, then we can keep demand ﬁxed (or at least exogenous to the
local shock). Third, export data is disaggregated at the municipality-product-destination
levels. This allows us to control for foreign demand shocks.
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In this section, we test whether the Drug War aﬀected exports. For each municipality
m, we observe the annual amount (in Pesos) of product p exported to country c. There
is one caveat about the data. When a ﬁrm has a single plant or all their plants are in
the same municipality, the exports reﬂect directly the municipality. When ﬁrms have
multiple plants in diﬀerent municipalities within the same state, then an approximation
is made based on the workforce of each plant. Regressions take the form:
ymcb = α + βPANwinm + δf(Marginm, PANwinm) + αcb + mcb (3)
where ymcb is the growth in exports of product p to country c in municipality m. More
speciﬁcally, ymcb is the log of the amount exported in the third year of the new adminis-
tration, divided by the amount exported in the third year of the previous administration,
when elections took place. αcb is a set of country of destination-product dummies, which
allows us to control for foreign demand shocks, similar to the strategy implemented by
Paravisini et al. (2014).
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics and tests if municipalities where PAN won
diﬀer from municipalities where PAN lost. Municipalities won by PAN tend to be more
open. The mean of total exports is higher. These diﬀerences are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Diﬀerences remain not signiﬁcant after reducing the sample to close elections.
Moreover, if we use the instrument that considers neighbor exposure, treated and control
municipalities are similar in their levels of trade ex-ante.
In table 2.4 we report the regressions of export growth on close PAN wins using
the same weighting by population.37 With country of destination dummies, we show
that a close PAN win caused a decrease of 42% in export growth. When we control
for destination-product dummies, export growth decrease by 40%. These controls also
alleviate concerns that diﬀerential changes in the terms of trade of certain products drive
the result. Therefore, after the implementation of the DrugWar, municipalities performed
worse in terms of trade even when the more open party was elected.
To test whether the negative eﬀect on trade is due to the PAN election itself and
not their implementation of the Drug War, we run a placebo regression on the previous
municipal elections. Data is available from 2004, so we take export growth until 2006,
the ﬁrst year of the Drug War.38 Table 2.6 reports the results from the elections after
and before the Drug War. Before the Drug War, the close PAN wins had no eﬀects on
exports growth. After the Drug War, the eﬀect on export growth is signiﬁcantly negative.
This favors the hypothesis that the Drug War, and not the PAN election in itself, had
negative eﬀects on trade.
37Miss-reporting, or lack of information, for ﬁrms in smaller municipalities is still a concern in this
setting. Therefore, we decide to weight by population. Results are robust in the standard OLS regression
38The Drug War started in December 2006
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Still the eﬀects could be driven by particular policies implemented by PAN mayors
in the treated municipality. To alleviate this concern we use a diﬀerent identiﬁcation.
We deﬁne treatment as having a neighbor municipality that elected a PAN mayor in a
close election. This is not a RDD in itself. However, we can still perform some of the
standard RDD tests. For example, we can show exports growth on a running variable
that accounts for the neighbors average voting shares in close elections. The main result
of the paper can be observed graphically in ﬁgure 2.5. As the diﬀerence among vote
shares approach zero we can see a discontinuous and signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on export
growth.
As we can see in Table 2.7, a PAN mayor elected in a neighbor municipality has a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on export growth when controlling only for destination ﬁxed
eﬀects. When controlling for destination-product ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant
5% decrease in export growth if the municipality has at least one neighbor that elected
a PAN mayor in a close election.
Finally, we breakdown the results according to the degree of complexity in diﬀerent
products. We use the Product Complexity Index (PCI) from the Atlas of Economic
Complexity developed by Hausmann et al (2011) to separate products. This measure
uses trade data to determine the complexity of a product according to two characteristics:
ubiquity and the average diversity of its exporters. In theory, a more complex product is
produced by countries that export many products, but it is also produced by few countries
(Hausmann et al, 2011). Complexity is relevant in our setting because it predicts future
GDP growth. More complex economies tend to grow more (Hausmann et al, 2011). If
the Drug War aﬀected more complex products, then the long term eﬀects would be more
pernicious. Second, since complex products are exported by few countries, they are more
likely to be traced. In consequence, they are not the most desirable legal products to hide
illegal trade. An eﬀect on complex products is less likely to be related to illegal trade,
but to external eﬀects of the Drug War on the economy.
In table 2.8 we report a monotonic pattern in export growth. We divide products in
four quartiles depending on how they rank in terms of the economic complexity index. For
low complexity the eﬀects on export growth are indistinguishable from zero, or positive
if we control for product-destination dummies. The higher the complexity the more
negative and signiﬁcant the eﬀects over export's growth. This suggests that in the treated
municipalities the negative impacts are concentrated in more complex industries.
Overall the results suggest that the election of PAN had signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on
trade at the municipality level. By running placebo regression on previous elections, we
established that this eﬀect is not related to the election of PAN itself, but on the election
of PAN at the time of the Drug War. This suggests that the main driver of the negative
performance was the implementation of the Drug War. Furthermore, we ﬁnd indicative
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evidence that the eﬀects are related to unintended consequences of the policy and not to
a drop in export of illegal goods.
2.5.2 Change in ﬁrms' exports
Whether we are looking directly at the sample of municipalities that experienced close
PAN elections or at their neighboring municipalities, the nature of this electoral discon-
tinuity allows us to study the economic eﬀects of increased violence at a microeconomic
level. Leveraging from a panel of formal plants in Mexico39, we now evaluate whether
being exposed to a marginal PAN victory in a ﬁrm's municipality or neighboring munic-
ipality leads to a change in its export performance. This helps us assess whether local
exposition to the war on drugs negatively aﬀect economic activities of exporting ﬁrms.
We focus on ﬁrms that, at baseline, exported from a single plant40, and evaluate the
change in their exports. Speciﬁcally, for both samples of municipalities with close PAN
elections and municipalities neighboring close PAN elections, we estimate the following
equation:
log
[X t′fm
X tfm
](t′−t) = β0 + β1PANwinm + δf(Marginm, PANwinm) + ψi + fm (4)
Where X tfm stands for the exports of ﬁrm f located in municipality m in baseline year
t. The dependent variable captures the logarithm of the average yearly growth factor in
total exports at the ﬁrm level between years t and t′. β1 captures the percent diﬀerence
in the average yearly growth factor of the exports of ﬁrms marginally exposed to a PAN
mayor in their municipality or in a neighboring municipality. We control for industry
ﬁxed-eﬀects and cluster standard errors at the municipality level.
Table 2.9 shows the results to these speciﬁcations. Panel A captures the eﬀect of
locating in a municipality under a close PAN victory on a ﬁrm's exports between 2007
and 2010. Panel B shows this eﬀect between 2004 and 2006, providing a pre-trend
estimate of the regressions in Panel A. Panel C provides a placebo speciﬁcation using
electoral results for local governments inaugurated in 2004 on a ﬁrm's exports between
2004 and 2006. Panel D through F show analogous estimates but for ﬁrms but for the
sample of municipalities neighboring close PAN elections. Each column provides estimates
39This anonymous panel of formal plants in Mexico between 2004 and 2014 is built with administrative
data provided by Mexican Social Security and Tax Authorities. It constituted part of the microdata
used in the Mexican Atlas of Economic Complexity. We worked with this data locally at Harvard's
Center for International Development, who partnered with the Mexican government in developing this
data visualization tool. Information about the Mexican Atlas of Economic Complexity is available at
http://complejidad.datos.gob.mx.
40We work with single-plant ﬁrms so as to ensure the adequate location of origin in exports.
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for diﬀerent samples of ﬁrms, according to either their size or the economic complexity
of their industries. Column 1 shows estimates for all plants. Columns 2 and 3 show
estimates for plants below and above the median ﬁrm size in the sample. Columns 4 and
5 show estimates for plants in industries representing the bottom and top quartiles of the
complexity distribution41.
Estimates in table 2.9 show important negative eﬀects. Panel A shows that for the
sample of all single plant ﬁrms, the growth factor of ﬁrms marginally exposed to a PAN
mayor is about 12% lower. This eﬀect seems to concentrate on ﬁrms below the median size
in the sample, for which the eﬀect is of about 20%. We observe no eﬀect for the sample
of ﬁrms above the median ﬁrm size. The eﬀect seems to be greater for high complexity
ﬁrms: While being marginally exposed to PAN mayors in the lowest complexity quartile
associates with export growth ratios 16% lower, this eﬀect is over 40% lower in the high
complexity quartile. While Panel B shows pre-trend coeﬃcients that are statistically
signiﬁcant for all ﬁrms and ﬁrms below the median size, these have the opposite sign.
Placebo estimates in Panel C only show statistical signiﬁcance at the 90% of conﬁdence
for the sample of low complexity ﬁrms. Panel D shows similar results for the sample
of municipalities neighboring close PAN elections. Export growth ratios are about 17%
lower for ﬁrms marginally neighboring a close PAN mayor in the full sample of ﬁrms, in
the sample of ﬁrms below the median size and in the sample of ﬁrms in low complexity
sectors, but we do not ﬁnd an eﬀect for ﬁrms in high complexity sectors. Now again, Panel
E shows only one statistically signiﬁcant pre-trend coeﬃcient for small ﬁrms exposed
to neighboring PAN victories, with the opposite sign. All coeﬃcients in the Placebo
estimates in Panel F are statistically insigniﬁcant.
2.5.3 Displacement of Firms' Operations
One important channel through which the Drug War can aﬀect ﬁrms is by displacing
their operations away from locations experiencing increased levels of violence. We can
evaluate whether this was the case by assessing how the share of a ﬁrm's wagebill changes
as a consequence of a PAN victory in its municipality or in a neighboring municipality.
In particular, we evaluate whether the share of a ﬁrm's wagebill in municipalities with
a close PAN election had lower growth if these were treated municipalities where PAN
obtained a victory, or municipalities neighboring such treatment.
To better test for this hypothesis, we work with a sample of ﬁrms that:
• Operated inside and outside of our sample of municipalities with close PAN elections
at baseline.
41Plants are segmented by economic complexity levels according to scores for each of the 256 industry
classiﬁcations available the Mexican Atlas of Economic Complexity.
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• Operated either in treatment or in control municipalities (that is, we exclude ﬁrms
that operated in both treatment and control municipalities).
For this sample of ﬁrms, we run the following regression:
log
[W t′fm/W t′f
W tfm/W
t
f
](t′−t) = β0+β1PANwinm+δf(Marginm, PANwinm)+ψi+fm (5)
Where W tfm is the wagebill of a ﬁrm f in close-election municipality m at time t. The
dependent variable would express the logarithm of the yearly average growth factor in the
share of employment of a ﬁrm in a given municipality in our sample of close elections. β1,
our coeﬃcient of interest, measures the eﬀect of being on (or neighboring) a close PAN
victory on the growth of the share of ﬁrms' operations in close election municipalities.
We control for industry ﬁxed eﬀects and size of the municipality. We cluster standard
errors at the municipality level.
Table 2.10 shows the results for these regressions, and is structured as table 2.9.
Panels A and C show results between 2007 and 2010 for the sample of municipalities
with close PAN elections or neighboring close PAN elections respectively, while Panels B
and D provide the respective placebo speciﬁcations for the same sample of municipalities
but evaluating changes in ﬁrms' wagebill between 2004 and 2007. Similarly, we provide
estimates for diﬀerent size/complexity segments of the sample of ﬁrms in the diﬀerent
columns of each panel.
While the results in table 2.10 do not show statistically signiﬁcant estimates for the
full set of ﬁrms, segmenting by complexity levels allows us to observe negative and statis-
tically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the sample of ﬁrms in high complexity sectors of the economy.
Panel A shows that with a 90% level of conﬁdence, the average yearly growth factor in
the share of a ﬁrm's wagebill in a municipality with a close election is 6.5% lower for
municipalities with PAN victory. The corresponding pre-treatment and placebo coeﬃ-
cients shows positive and non-statistically signiﬁcant results. The analysis of the sample
of municipalities neighboring PAN elections in Panel D shows an eﬀect of 19% lower
growth ratio in the wagebill share of high-complexity ﬁrms in municipalities neighbor-
ing PAN mayors, but the respective pre-treatment result also shows a similar negative
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. These results lend some additional support to the
ﬁndings described above, outlining how the economic eﬀects of the Mexican Drug War
concentrated in relatively advanced sectors of the Mexican economy.
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2.6 Mechanisms
In this section we test whether the main eﬀects are driven by: (1) spillovers from
illegal markets to legal markets, (2) labor displacement from the aﬀected regions.
A reduction in exports in the legal markets can be capturing a drop in illegal markets.
One of the methods employed by cartels to smuggle drugs is hiding them in legal exports.
Given the substantial size of Mexican drug exports, it could be the case that the reduction
in exports is driven by illegal products, and not a debilitated business environment.42
Testing this hypothesis is challenging, because of the lack of information about the
illegal market, thus the evidence that we provide is only suggestive. We will use the vari-
ation in exports across diﬀerent destinations to test whether the eﬀects are concentrated
in destinations that are likely to be traﬃcking hubs.
What are the patterns across trading partners? In tables 2.11 and 2.A4 (in the
appendix) we separate the eﬀect across important trading partners of Mexico. We divide
countries in four groups: Europe, China, United States and a group formed by three
countries: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. These regions are not only important trading
partners in legal products, but, with the exception of China, play important roles in the
drug business. The US and Europe are the main consumers, while Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia are the main exporters of coca and cocaine.43
First, we look at countries that are main export destinations for drug traﬃcking from
Mexico. According to the World Drug Report (2010) Mexico is a main producer of
opioids. It also plays an important role in the distribution of cocaine. In 2004, Mexico
exported 90% of the cocaine consumed in the US (O'Neil (2009)). Therefore, if we are
only capturing an eﬀect related to drug traﬃcking then only destinations like US or
Europe should be aﬀected. Indeed, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant drop for the US. But no eﬀect
for Europe. On the other hand, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and larger decrease in export growth
to China, which is unlikely to be related to drug traﬃcking itself.
We then revisit the evidence on complexity. We argue that trades on high complexity
products are easier to trace and, therefore, less likely to be useful as covers for illegal trade.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly larger negative eﬀects on municipality level export growth for high
complexity products. This eﬀect persists when we use ﬁrm level data. Furthermore,
ﬁrms that produce more complex products face larger and signiﬁcant decreases for wage
bill growth. The larger results on high complexity products are less likely to support the
hypothesis that decreases in illegal exports, instead of worse economic conditions, explain
42Estimates of total Mexican drug exports to the US vary substantially, from US$ 6.6 billion to as
much as US$ 39 billion (Kilmer et al. (2010)). In 2008, Mexico legal exports to the US amounted to
US$ 230 billion.
43In 2006, 84% of the Mexican legal exports went to the US; 4.5% to Europe, 0.7% to China, and 1,3%
to Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Out of total imports, 49.04% comes from the US, 12% from Europe, and
9.7% from China, and 0.43% from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.
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our ﬁndings.
We also test whether our eﬀects are driven by worker scarcity at the local level.
There is plenty of research and evidence on how violence makes it more likely for people
to emigrate from a location. 44
To test this hypothesis we collect census data about worker migration at the munic-
ipality level inside Mexico. At 2009, workers are asked whether they were living at a
diﬀerent municipality 5 years before and they specify their municipality of origin. We
identify workers that left a particular municipality, but now leave in a new one as mi-
grants.
Using this data, we ﬁnd some evidence of workers displacement. Although the sig-
niﬁcance is not robust to weighting, we can see from table 2.12 that the coeﬃcient is
always positive and economically signiﬁcant.45 Moreover, when we use the instrument
that accounts for the size of the treated neighbor, the coeﬃcient is always positive and
signiﬁcant. In the baseline OLS regression, a one standard deviation shock to the popu-
lation of neighboring municipalities that elected a PAN major causes a 28% increase in
the number of workers that leave the municipality of interest. The direct eﬀect of a PAN
major in the municipality translates to a non statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect equivalent to
a 23% increase in migration from that municipality of origin.
Notice that our data only accounts for workers that remain inside Mexico. According
to Encuesta Nacional de Dinámica Demográﬁca 1.64 million Mexicans left Mexico for
the US in the period from 2005-2009. Our results are likely to underestimate the impact
of the Drug War because a large share of Mexican workers migrate abroad. Moreover,
emigration might not be the only in which violence aﬀects the workforce. It could, for
example, increase absenteeism at the ﬁrm level or make it harder for workers to take after
hour jobs. These are interesting questions, but we cannot explore these channels with
the current data.
Banking results also agree with our channel. At face value, it would be hard to obtain
results in credit expansion after a close election result. There is evidence that government
owned banks might increase lending in municipalities controlled by the Central govern-
ment (Carvalho, 2014) or politicians might increase credit in areas where elections would
be more competitive (Cole, 2009). Therefore, our eﬀect is likely a lower bound of the
real eﬀect of violence on the banking sector. In our estimations we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on credit, but we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant decreases in bank savings at local branches,
the number of bank accounts opened, and a signiﬁcant decrease in new branches in mu-
44For general evidence in how violence aﬀects migration decisions see Adhikari (2013). For evidence
speciﬁc to Latin America see Clemens (2017), Arceo-Gómez (2013), Cantor (2014), Chamarbagwala &
Morán (2011), Engel & Ibañez (2007), Ibañez & Vélez (2008), and Martínez (2014).
45The regressions are log-level regressions.i.e., a variation of 1 unit in the independent variable trans-
lates into 100*β% change in the dependent variable.
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nicipalities where PAN won a close election.46 We interpret the disruption in everyday
bank operations as a consequence of worker displacement.
2.7 Conclusion
The Mexican Drug War has drawn the attention of the population, the media and the
academia because of the scale of its consequences. We conﬁrm the results in Dell (2015),
who provides evidence that homicides increase disproportionately in municialities where
the rollout of the war eﬀort was supported by PAN mayors. We provide evidence that
other crimes increased as well, albeit our estimates are only suggestive. These overall
increases in crimes suggest other potential unintended consequences of the Drug War.
We take a step further and try to assess how the Drug War aﬀected the real economy.
We argue that a direct, reduced-form approach would yield lower-bound estimates of
the negative economic eﬀects of increased violence, and we provide placebo estimates on
previous elections to test the direct economic eﬀects of narrow PAN victories outside the
context of the Mexican Drug War.
We document a negative change in trade patterns, with export growth decreasing sig-
niﬁcantly after a close PAN win. The declines do not depend on whether the destination
is a main international drug trade route through Mexico. If anything, the eﬀects are
stronger for countries that are not part of the main drug trade routes, like China. Ad-
ditionally, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects are stronger for more complex products. We interpret
the results as evidence of external eﬀects from the Drug War, as these eﬀects are not
observed outside the context of the Drug War.
Observing ﬁrm-level microdata, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms locating in a municipality that was
exposed to a PANmayor or that neighbored a PANmayor faced lower export growth rates,
and that these eﬀects may have been greater for smaller ﬁrms and for high complexity sec-
tors of the economy. We also ﬁnd evidence of workforce displacement of high-complexity
ﬁrms away from municipalities with a PAN mayor or neighboring a PAN mayor.
The main results suggest that the Drug War did not only cost many lives, but also
negatively changed Mexico's economy.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Annual homicides
Figure 2.2: Spatial distribution of homicides
Panel A. Total homicides 2007-2011 Panel B. Change 2007-2011 and 2001-2006
Notes: Panel A depicts the geographical distribution of total homicides between 2007 and 20011 per 100,000 inhabi-
tants. Panel B depicts total homicides between 2007 and 2011 minus total homicides between 2001 and 2006, per 100,000
inhabitants. It is not possible to compute growth rates or logs because many municipalities have zero homicides.
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Figure 2.3: Spatial distribution of of electoral outcomes
Panel A. All municipalities Panel B. Spread 5%
Notes: Panel A depicts the geographical distribution of PAN victories and losses in the 2007 and 2008 local elections.
Panel B depicts PAN victories and losses by a margin smaller than 5%.
Figure 2.4: Cumulative Homicides on the Average Diﬀerences of Close Elections in Neigh-
bor Municipalities
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Figure 2.5: Exports on Average Diﬀerences in Close Elections of Neighbor Municipalities
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Baseline characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total sample Spread 5% Neighbor election (5% Spread)
All PAN won PAN lost P-value PAN won PAN lost P-value PAN won PAN lost P-value
Panel A: baseline characteristics
Population 2005 35019 38396 34270 0.54 59232 42934 0.44 37968 33170 0.48
(97487) (126163) (89949) (190580) (103344) (111913) (66014)
Population ages 15-29 25.6 26.2 25.5 0 26.2 25.9 0.33 26 25.6 0.05
(% of total) (2.5) (2.2) (2.5) (2.3) (2.6) (2.3) (2.5)
Population density, 2005 151.9 162.9 149.4 0.61 209.6 188.14 0.75 129.5 148.14 0.48
(381.5) (385.1) (380.8) (465.8) (466.3) (287.2) (377.1)
PAN incumbent 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.49 0.31 0.32 0.84 0.24 0.32 0.02
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47) (0.43) (0.47)
GDP per capita 5740 5996 5683 0.09 6085 6228 0.74 5699 5814 0.55
(USD, 2005) (2678) (2942) (2613) (3360) (2759) (2392) (2723)
Literacy rate ages 95.2 95.6 95.1 0.13 95.5 96.1 0.29 95.1 95.8 0.03
(ages 15-24, 2005) (4.9) (4.1) (5.1) (4.3) (3.2) (4.7) (3.6)
Mean years of 5.9 6.1 5.9 0.16 6.1 6.1 0.97 6 6 0.64
schooling, 2005 (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.3)
Mean Homicides, 2006 11.77 9.31 12.31 0.04 12.03 12.66 0.86 12.18 11.36 0.64
per 100 Population (20.75) (19.09) (21.07) (20.77) (21.62) (23.16) (23.14)
Observations 1416 257 1159 87 111 300 386
Panel B: Baseline trade characteristics
Total exports 52.5 81 46.1 0.14 178.6 71.5 0.35 37.2 47.7 0.45
(340) (681.6) (195.7) (1160.4) (259.2) (140.8) (202.3)
Exports: number 19 19.5 18.9 0.71 22.6 22.6 1 18.9 18.7 0.85
of countries (19.9) (22.5) (19.3) (27.2) (23.6) (19.3) (19.6)
Exports: number of 2.2 2.5 2.1 0.07 3.2 2.6 0.4 2.2 2.2 0.88
products per country (2.8) (4.1) (2.4) (6.1) (3.7) (3.3) (2.2)
Total imports 29.7 59.9 23 0.04 147.6 50.5 0.31 21.8 26.2 0.67
(266.2) (570.2) (120.3) (971) (229.6) (118.8) (143.2)
Imports: number 7.7 8.4 7.5 0.45 11.4 10.7 0.82 7 7.6 0.61
of countries (16.7) (20.1) (15.8) (27.4) (19.7) (17.3) (15.1)
Imports: number of 2.8 3.3 2.7 0.11 4.7 3.6 0.35 2.7 2.8 0.87
products per country (5.5) (6.8) (5.2) (9.6) (7) (5.7) (4.9)
Observations 1416 257 1159 87 111 320 413
Notes: Columns 1-3 report means for all municipalities in which elections occurred in 2007 and 2008. Columns 5-6 restrict the sample to municipalities
where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%. Columns 8-9 restrict for municipalities that had at least one neighbor facing a close election and in
all of those close neighboring elections either PAN won or PAN lost (i.e we exclude municipalities exposed to a treatment and a control at the same time).
Columns 4, 7, and 10 report p-values of t-tests on the diﬀerence in means. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Eﬀect on homicides, 5% spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election (07 and 08 elections)
PAN win 0.02 0.79 0.79 25.90** 41.22** 41.22*
(5.34) (9.63) (7.30) (12.65) (18.98) (19.79)
Linear pol. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Cluster: state level No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.172 0.253 0.253
Panel B: Average homicide 3 years before election (07 and 08 elections)
PAN win 1.59 1.36 1.36 3.29 3.76 3.76
(2.48) (4.00) (5.87) (2.71) (4.32) (4.80)
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.030 0.034 0.034
Panel C: Average homicide 3 years after minus 3 years before election (07 and 08 elections)
PAN win -1.57 -0.56 -0.56 22.61** 37.47** 37.47**
(4.44) (8.27) (3.84) (10.80) (16.62) (16.81)
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.179 0.301 0.301
Panel D: Placebo, average homicides 3 years after election(04 and 05 elections)
PAN win 2.73 5.97 5.97 -5.08** -0.81 -0.81
(2.09) (5.71) (3.52) (2.22) (3.09) (2.35)
Observations 247 247 247 247 247 247
R-squared 0.006 0.016 0.016 0.095 0.122 0.122
Notes: Columns 1-3 report standard OLS regressions. Columns 4-6 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined
by population size in 2005. The dependent variable in panels A and D is average annual homicides per 100,000 population
in the three years following local elections; in panel B the dependent variable is average annual homicides per 100,000
population in the three years preceding local elections; and in panel C the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between the
dependent variables of panels A and B. In panels A, B and C, the sample is comprised of municipalities where PAN won
or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections. In panels D, the sample is comprised of municipalities
where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2004 and 2005 elections. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Homicides Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Standard OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election (2007 and 2008 elections)
PAN win 4.46** 0.18 11.17* 11.15
Neighbor (2.07) (4.21) (6.14) (12)
Standardized Pop 2** 1.85* 3.7*** 3.5***
Treated Neighbor (1.02) (1.06) (1.22) (1.27)
Linear polynomial No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.22
Panel B: Average homicide 3 years before election (2007 and 2008 elections)
PAN win 2.95** -5.66* 1.8 -0.91
Neighbor (1.28) (2.89) (1.3) (2.71)
Standardized Pop 0.003 -0.25 0.6*** 0.5***
Treated Neighbor (0.31) (0.38) (0.17) (0.18)
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Panel C: Average homicide 3 years after election minus 3 years before election(2007 and 2008 elections)
PAN win 1.51 5.84* 9.36* 12.06
Neighbor (1.68) (3.33) (5.23) (10.11)
Standardized Pop 2** 2** 3.1*** 2.9***
Treated Neighbor (0.79) (0.79) (1.07) (1.10)
Observations 686 686 686 686
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.24 0.25
Panel D: Placebo, average homicides 3 years after election(2004 and 2005 elections)
PAN win -1.53 -3.79 -10.13* -0.93
Neighbor (2.7) (5.29) (5.37) (5.71)
Standardized Pop -2.51*** -2.10*** -2.4*** -1.4***
Treated Neighbor (0.46) (0.81) (0.83) (0.39)
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 662
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.07
Notes: Columns 1-3 report standard OLS regressions. Columns 4-6 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined
by population size in 2005. The dependent variable in panels A and D is average annual homicides per 100,000 population
in the three years following local elections; in panel B the dependent variable is average annual homicides per 100,000
population in the three years preceding local elections; and in panel C the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between the
dependent variables of panels A and B. In panels D, we study the eﬀects after the 2004 and 2005 elections (before the Drug
War policy) as a placebo. The explanatory variable PAN win Neighbor is a dummy that takes value 1 if (i) a municipality
has at least one neighbor facing a close election (ii) all of these neighbors with close elections choose PAN. It takes a value
of zero if (i) a municipality has at least one neighbor facing a close election (ii) all of these neighbors with close elections
choose a party diﬀerent from PAN. (i.e, we exclude municipalities with no neighbors facing close elections or with multiple
neighbors facing close elections with mixed results between them). Standardized Population gives us the
Pop−Mean(Pop)
sd(Pop)
of the municipalities that elected a PAN mayor in a close election. Where the mean and standard deviations are obtained
from the means of all Mexican municipalities. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Total exports & imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Exports
PAN win -0.18*** -0.36*** -0.41*** -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.53*** -0.55*** -0.40***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Linear RD Polynomial No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country of destination FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Product-country of destination FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 17,735 17,735 17,721 15,185 17,735 17,735 17,721 15,185
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.59
Panel B: Imports
PAN win -0.11 -0.21* -0.26** -0.18 -0.15** -0.12 -0.17** -0.14**
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 23,181 23,181 23,164 19,892 23,181 23,181 23,164 19,892
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.40
Notes: Columns 1-4 report standard OLS regressions; columns 5-8 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. In panel A (B), the dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total exports (imports)
in the ﬁnal year of the new incumbent's term, divided by total exports (imports) in the year when elections took place. In panel B, country of
destination dummies refer to country of origin dummies. The sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination (origin)-product
where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the dependent variable for the triple is positive over
the new incumbent's term.
Table 2.5: Placebo and pre-trends: total exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Exports, placebo 2004-2005 Elections
PAN win -0.10*** -0.14** -0.11 -0.18** -0.11*** -0.12 -0.13 -0.21
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14)
Linear RD Polynomial No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country of destination FE No No No Yes No No Yes No
Product-country of destination FE No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 17,508 17,508 17,495 14,682 17,058 17,508 17,495 14,682
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.60
Panel B: Exports, pre-trends 2007-2008 elections
PAN win 0.06 0.13 0.14* 0.35** 0.10* 0.09 0.11 0.47***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11)
Observations 13,572 13,572 13,572 10,959 13,572 13,572 13,552 19,959
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.59
Notes: Columns 1-4 report standard OLS regressions; columns 5-8 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in
2005. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. In panel A the dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total exports in
the ﬁnal year of the new incumbent's term, divided by total exports in the year when elections took place for the election that happened before
the Drug War was implemented. In panel B the dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total exports one year before the election took
place, divided by the initial exports three years before. The sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination (origin)-product
where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2004 and 2005 elections and (ii) the dependent variable for the triple is positive
over the term.
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Table 2.6: Placebo: total exports & imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (7) (8)
2007 and 2008 elections Placebo: 2004 and 2005 elections
Panel A: Exports
PAN win -0.17*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.12*** -0.11 -0.12 -0.19
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13)
Linear RD Polynomial No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country of destination FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Product-country of destination Fe No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 18,147 18,147 18,133 15,556 16,007 16,007 15,995 13,480
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.61
Panel A: Imports
PAN win -0.11** -0.10 -0.14* -0.12 0.01 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.16***
(0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 23,517 23,517 23,499 20,202 23,244 23,244 23,228 19,864
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.41
Notes: All columns report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. In panel A (B), the dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total exports (imports) in the second year of the new incumbent's term,
divided by total exports (imports) in the year when elections took place. The sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination
(origin)-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the dependent variable for the triple
is positive over the ﬁrst two years of the new incumbent's term.
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Table 2.7: Trade Eﬀects of a close PAN election in a neighbor municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7)
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Log export growth (2007 and 2008 elections)
PAN win -0.17*** -0.11** 0 -0.31*** -0.37*** -0.05
Neighbor (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Linear polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country No Yes No No Yes No
Product-country No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 36630 36619 33567 36309 36298 33251
R-squared 0.0015 0.0336 0.5525 0.0018 0.0233 0.62
Panel B: Placebo, log export growth (2004 and 2005 elections)
PAN win -0.05 -0.05 -0.04* -0.02 -0.05* -0.04
Neighbor (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Observations 24853 22052 22052 24853 24840 22052
R-squared 0.0002 0.5413 0.5413 0.0002 0.0233 0.5413
Panel C: Log export growth (2007 and 2008 elections)
Standardised Pop -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.06*** 0.01
Treated Neighbor (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 36630 36619 33567 36309 36298 33251
R-squared 0.0029 0.0355 0.55 0.0019 0.0234 0.5649
Panel B: Placebo, log export growth (2004 and 2005 elections)
Standardised Pop -0.008 -0.01** -0.003 0 -0.008*** -0.002
Treated Neighbor (0.007) 0.008 (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Observations 24853 26439 22052 24853 24840 22052
R-squared 0.0001 0.0295 0.5077 0.0001 0.0233 0.5413
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. The
PAN win Neighbor Dummy takes value 1 if (i) a municipality has at least one neighbor facing a close election (ii) all of
these neighbors with close elections choose PAN. It takes a value of zero if (i) a municipality has at least one neighbor
facing a close election (ii) all of these neighbors with close elections choose a party diﬀerent from PAN. (i.e, we exclude
municipalities with no neighbors facing close elections or with multiple neighbors facing close elections with mixed results
between them). Standardized Population gives us the
Pop−Mean(Pop)
sd(Pop)
of the municipalities that elected a PAN mayor in
a close election. Where the mean and standard deviations are obtained from the means of all Mexican municipalities.
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Table 2.8: Exports per quartile of product complexity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1st quartile (low) 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile (high)
Panel A: Exports (WLS)
PAN win -0.07 0.11 -0.17 -0.32 -0.68*** -0.32*** -0.88*** -0.65***
(0.25) (0.34) (0.14) (0.23) (0.06) (0.05) (0.29) (0.11)
Linear RD Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of destination FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Product-country of destination FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,899 3,535 3,790 3,220 4,695 4,011 5,306 4,418
R-squared 0.10 0.58 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.60 0.05 0.59
Panel B: Exports (OLS)
PAN win -0.07 -0.07 -0.23** -0.22* -0.59*** -0.28** -0.60*** -0.48***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.12)
Observations 4,558 4,113 4,511 3,853 5,698 4,820 6,622 5,480
R-squared 0.09 0.58 0.08 0.52 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.49
Panel C: Exports (WLS)
PAN win 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.83*** -0.25 -0.31** -0.1
Neighbor (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18)
Observations 12,485 12,056 8,202 7,463 7,198 6,361 8,375 7,326
R-squared 0.0708 0.61 0.07 0.66 0.05 0.60 0.03 0.62
Panel D: Exports (OLS)
PAN win -0.02 0.001 -0.02 0.03 -0.55*** -0.04 -0.22* -0.06
Neighbor (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)
Observations 12,739 12,310 8,256 7,519 7,202 6,365 8,384 7,328
R-squared 0.14 0.64 0.1 0.59 0.04 0.49 0.04 0.49
Notes: All columns report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. The dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total exports in the ﬁnal year of the new incumbent's term, divided by total exports in
the year when elections took place. Country of destination dummies refer to country of origin dummies. In Panel A and B The sample is comprised
of triples municipality-country of destination (origin)-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections
and (ii) the dependent variable for the triple is positive over the new incumbent's term. In Panel C and D the sample is comprised of triples
municipality-country of destination (origin)-product for municipalities that had (i) at least one neighbor facing a close elections and (ii) if multiple
neighbors face a close elections, the results are not mixed across parties. The explanatory variable PAN win Neighbor is a dummy that takes value 1
if (i) a municipality has at least one neighbor facing a close election (ii) all of these neighbors with close elections choose PAN. It takes a value of zero
if (i) a municipality has at least one neighbor facing a close election (ii) all of these neighbors with close elections choose a party diﬀerent from PAN.
(i.e, we exclude municipalities with no neighbors facing close elections or with multiple neighbors facing close elections with mixed results between
them). Products are divided in 1241 categories. We divide the 1241 products in four groups according to their complexity as deﬁned by the Atlas of
Economic Complexity.
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Table 2.9: Firm-level export growth regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Small Large Low complexity High complexity
ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms
Panel A: Firm-level regressions - own municipality
PAN win -0.131*** -0.217*** -0.0231 -0.183** -0.552***
(0.0473) (0.0635) (0.126) (0.0902) (0.180)
Observations 1,543 771 771 525 194
R-squared 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.24
Panel B: Firm-level pre-treatment - own municipality
PAN win 0.299** 0.318* 0.268 0.287 0.422
(0.132) (0.168) (0.182) (0.176) (0.401)
Observations 1,831 914 915 604 356
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.09 0.07
Panel C: Firm-Level placebo - own municipality
PAN win -0.0193 -0.0987 0.0677 -0.256* 0.0815
(0.0683) (0.119) (0.120) (0.143) (0.212)
Observations 1,360 681 679 452 238
R-squared 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.12
Panel D: Firm-level regression - neighboring municipalities
PAN win -0.187** -0.181* -0.18 -0.194** 0.784
(0.0760) (0.0965) (0.187) (0.0806) (0.954)
Observations 1,846 922 924 749 209
R-squared 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.21
Panel E: Firm-level pre-treatment - neighboring municipalities
PAN win 0.09 0.24** -0.22 0.18 -0.09
-0.0871 (0.109) (0.209) (0.130) (0.282)
Observations 2,189 1,094 1,095 867 409
R-squared 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.07
Panel F: Firm-level placebo - neighboring municipalities
PAN win -0.21 -0.10 -0.25 -0.30 -0.35
(0.156) (0.262) (0.261) (0.234) (0.264)
Observations 1,076 538 538 441 160
R-squared 0.15 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.17
Notes: All regressions include 1st order polynomial terms around the electoral discontinuity, as well as population controls
and industry-level ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Panel A captures the eﬀect of
locating in a municipality under a close PAN victory on export growth between 2007 and 2010. Panel B shows this eﬀect
between 2004 and 2006, providing a pre-treatment estimate of the regressions in Panel A. Panel C uses electoral results
from 2004 to predict the eﬀect between 2004 and 2006, providing Placebo estimates. Similarly, Panel D shows the eﬀect
of locating in a municipality neighboring a close PAN victory on the growth of exports of a ﬁrm between 2007 and 2010,
while panels E and F follow the same approaches of panels B and C, functioning as pre-treatment and placebo estimates of
the results in Panel D. The diﬀerent columns provide estimates for diﬀerent samples of ﬁrms, according to either their size
or the economic complexity of their industries. Column 1 shows estimates for all plants. Columns 2 and 3 show estimates
for plants below and above the median plant in the sample. Columns 4 and 5 show estimates for plants in industries
representing the bottom and top quartiles of the complexity distribution. Firms are segmented by economic complexity
levels according to scores for each of the 256 industry classiﬁcations available the Mexican Atlas of Economic Complexity.
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Table 2.10: Firm-level wage bill displacement regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Small Large Low complexity High complexity
ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms
Panel A: Firm-level regressions - own municipality
PAN win 0.00364 -0.00684 0.00915 0.00692 -0.0647*
(0.0113) (0.0107) (0.0165) (0.0157) (0.0363)
Observations 4,915 2,308 2,603 2,899 161
R-squared 0.046 0.089 0.062 0.033 0.257
Panel B: Firm-level pre-treatment - own municipality
PAN win -0.00618 0.00495 -0.0240 0.00891 0.0548
(0.0136) (0.0212) (0.0169) (0.0133) (0.0678)
Observations 5,003 2,478 2,525 2,792 160
R-squared 0.029 0.070 0.046 0.023 0.322
Panel C: Firm-Level placebo - own municipality
PAN win -0.0237 -0.0432 -0.00262 0.00804 0.0321
(0.0175) (0.0295) (0.0227) (0.0277) (0.0445)
Observations 4,579 2,050 2,529 2,336 175
R-squared 0.043 0.082 0.053 0.037 0.241
Panel D: Firm-level regression - neighboring municipalities
PAN win 0.00241 -0.00616 0.000284 0.000860 -0.176*
(0.0118) (0.0151) (0.0193) (0.0160) (0.0952)
Observations 4,633 2,012 2,621 2,830 121
R-squared 0.054 0.105 0.081 0.023 0.622
Panel E: Firm-level pre-treatment - neighboring municipalities
PAN win 0.0200 0.0423 -0.00818 0.0225 -0.162*
(0.0222) (0.0273) (0.0320) (0.0276) (0.0819)
Observations 4,667 2,160 2,505 2,675 111
R-squared 0.039 0.071 0.063 0.023 0.419
Panel F: Firm-level placebo - neighboring municipalities
PAN win -0.0351 -0.0679 -0.0101 -0.0235 -0.596
(0.0257) (0.0448) (0.0358) (0.0342) (0.506)
Observations 5,004 2,255 2,749 2,910 122
R-squared 0.033 0.060 0.060 0.022 0.384
Notes: All regressions include 1st order polynomial terms around the electoral discontinuity, as well as population controls
and industry-level ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Panel A captures the eﬀect of
locating in a municipality under a close PAN victory on the share of a ﬁrm's wage bill between 2007 and 2010. Panel B
shows this eﬀect between 2004 and 2006, providing a pre-treatment estimate of the regressions in Panel A. Panel C uses
electoral results from 2004 to predict the eﬀect between 2004 and 2006, providing Placebo estimates. Similarly, Panel D
shows the eﬀect of locating in a municipality neighboring a close PAN victory on the share of a ﬁrm's wage bill between
2007 and 2010, while panels E and F follow the same approaches of panels B and C, functioning as pre-treatment and
placebo estimates of the results in Panel D. The diﬀerent columns provide estimates for diﬀerent samples of ﬁrms, according
to either their size or the economic complexity of their industries. Column 1 shows estimates for all plants. Columns 2 and
3 show estimates for plants below and above the median plant in the sample. Columns 4 and 5 show estimates for plants
in industries representing the bottom and top quartiles of the complexity distribution. Firms are segmented by economic
complexity levels according to scores for each of the 256 industry classiﬁcations available the Mexican Atlas of Economic
Complexity.
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Table 2.11: Exports per region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Europe
PAN win -0.14** -0.22* -0.23** -0.11 -0.16* -0.14 -0.12 0.01
(0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22)
Linear RD Polynomial No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country of destination FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Product-country of destination FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 2,924 2,924 2,922 2,453 2,924 2,924 2,922 2,453
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.69
Panel B: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru
PAN win -0.43** -0.88*** -0.87*** -0.51** -0.61** -1.15*** -1.14*** -0.77*
(0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.41) (0.41) (0.39)
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,013 857 1,013 1,013 1,013 857
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.62 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.69
Panel C: United States
PAN win -0.14** -0.39*** -0.22 -0.16* -0.55*** -0.47***
(0.07) (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.15)
Observations 4,363 4,363 4,185 4,363 4,363 4,185
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.36
Panel D: China
PAN win 0.04 -0.53 -1.08** -0.04 -1.25*** -1.61***
(0.19) (0.42) (0.41) (0.22) (0.38) (0.44)
Observations 330 330 284 330 330 284
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.51 0.00 0.01 0.54
Notes: Columns 1-4 report standard OLS regressions; columns 5-8 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by pop-
ulation size in 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. In all panels, the dependent variable is the natural
logarithmic of total exports in the ﬁnal year of the new incumbent's term, divided by total exports in the year when elections
took place. The sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin
smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the dependent variable for the triple is positive over the new incumbent's
term. When the region is comprised of a single country, product-country of destination dummies are actually product dummies,
and the regressions with country of destination dummies are redundant.
Table 2.12: Aggregate labor displacement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
PANwin 0.23 1.62*
(0.60) (0.92)
PAN win 0.05 0.8**
neighbor (0.11) (0.38)
Standardized Pop 0.19*** 0.28***
Treated Neighbor (0.07) (0.04)
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.18
Observations 194 873 873 194 786 786
Notes: In all panels, the dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of migrating workers. In the direct close election
regressions we apply linear polynomial controls. The explanatory variable PAN win Neighbor is a dummy that takes value
1 if (i) a municipality has at least one neighbor facing a close election (ii) all of these neighbors with close elections choose
PAN. It takes a value of zero if (i) a municipality has at least one neighbor facing a close election (ii) all of these neighbors
with close elections choose a party diﬀerent from PAN. (i.e, we exclude municipalities with no neighbors facing close
elections or with multiple neighbors facing close elections with mixed results between them). Standardized Population
gives us the
Pop−Mean(Pop)
sd(Pop)
of the municipalities that elected a PAN mayor in a close election, where the mean and
standard deviations are obtained from the means of all Mexican municipalities.
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Appendix
Table 2.A1: Eﬀect on other crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS WLS OLS WLS
Panel A: Robbery (business establishments) Panel B: Assaults
PAN win 7.9 29.8** 46.5 68.5 13.5 42.6 142.9** 192.8
(7.491) (14.839) (35.284) (45.864) (17.919) (37.687) (66.821) (119.079)
Linear polynomial No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
R-squared 0.008 0.043 0.106 0.143 0.004 0.050 0.175 0.235
Panel C: Extortion Panel D: Kidnapping
PAN win -0.5 -0.5 1.7 4.7* -0.4 0.1 0.3 1.4
(0.685) (1.456) (2.189) (2.646) (0.303) (0.558) (0.643) (1.026)
R-squared 0.004 0.041 0.026 0.169 0.011 0.018 0.006 0.098
Panel E: Robbery (banks branches, Panel F: Robbery (all cases, excluding
cash-in-transit vehicles) business and banks)
PAN win 0.4 0.6 1.3 2.8* 39.8 254.4** 455.0 917.1***
(0.301) (0.423) (0.865) (1.616) (65.096) (126.760) (299.769) (345.038)
R-squared 0.015 0.019 0.118 0.323 0.003 0.049 0.123 0.217
Notes: Columns 1-2 and 5-6 report standard OLS regressions. Columns 3-4 and 7-8 report weighted regressions. Weights
are determined by population size in 2005. In all panels the dependent variables are averages of a certain crime type per
100,000 population in 2011. In panel A the dependent variable is robberies that targeted business establishments (including
cargo theft); in Panel B, assaults; in panel C, extortions; in Panel D, kidnapping; in Panel E, robberies that targeted bank
branches and cash-in-transit vehicles; and in Panel F, robberies (excluding business and banks). For all regressions, the
sample is comprised of municipalities where crime data is available and where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than
5% in the 2004 and 2005 elections. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.A2: Eﬀect on homicides, 3% spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard OLS Weighted OLS (Population 2005)
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election
PAN win -0.66 -0.20 -0.20 28.97** 47.91** 47.91**
(6.83) (9.06) (6.26) (13.87) (18.87) (19.36)
Linear polynomial No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Cluster: state level No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123
R-squared 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.185 0.306 0.306
Panel B: Average homicide 3 years before election
PAN win 1.29 1.48 1.48 4.23 2.40 2.40
(3.38) (4.41) (3.29) (3.15) (4.57) (4.85)
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.049 0.057 0.057
Panel C: Average homicide 3 years after election minus 3 years before election
PAN win -1.95 -1.68 -1.68 24.74** 45.51*** 45.51**
(5.74) (7.68) (4.84) (11.75) (17.29) (18.01)
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.182 0.340 0.340
Notes: Columns 1-3 report standard OLS regressions. Columns 4-6 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined
by population size in 2005. The dependent variable in panel A is average annual homicides per 100,000 population in the
three years following local elections; in panel B the dependent variable is average annual homicides per 100,000 population
in the three years preceding local elections; and in Panel C the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between the panel the
dependent variables of panels A and B. For all regressions, the sample is comprised of municipalities where PAN won or
lost by a margin smaller than 3% in the 2007 and 2008 elections. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.A3: Eﬀect on homicides, RD polynomials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election, 5% spread
PAN win 0.79 -0.25 20.92 27.27 41.22* 52.98*** 53.04** 68.11**
(7.30) (6.41) (32.52) (35.61) (19.79) (17.57) (21.86) (23.88)
Degree of polynomial 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.33
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election, total sample
PAN win 3.30 3.62 4.31 0.21 14.86 24.61** 31.65* 47.36**
(2.13) (3.33) (6.02) (5.83) (9.94) (11.46) (15.61) (22.20)
Observations 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05
Notes: Columns 1-4 report standard OLS regressions. Columns 5-8 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined
by population size in 2005. The dependent variable is average annual homicides per 100,000 population in the three years
following local elections. In Panel A, the sample is comprised of municipalities where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller
than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections. In Panel B the sample is comprised of all municipalities in which elections occurred
in 2007 and 2008. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 2.A4: Imports per region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Europe
PAN win 0.05 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17 0.10 -0.00 -0.07 -0.11
(0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.08)
Linear RD Polynomial No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country of origin FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Product-country of origin FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 5,922 5,922 5,921 4,762 5,922 5,922 5,921 4,762
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.44
Panel B: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru
PAN win -0.21 0.04 -0.12 0.87 -0.39* 0.32 0.22 1.16**
(0.26) (0.33) (0.31) (0.63) (0.20) (0.37) (0.34) (0.55)
Observations 106 106 106 68 106 106 106 68
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.59 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.74
Panel C: United States
PAN win -0.07 -0.16 -0.13 -0.08** -0.12 -0.13
(0.05) (0.11) (0.12) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09)
Observations 6,264 6,264 6,106 6,264 6,264 6,106
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.29
Panel D: China
PAN win -0.19 -0.43** -0.56*** -0.24 -0.44** -0.60***
(0.15) (0.20) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
Observations 2,411 2,411 2,252 2,411 2,411 2,252
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.34
Notes: Columns 1-4 report standard OLS regressions; columns 5-8 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined
by population size in 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. In all panels, the dependent variable is
the natural logarithmic of total imports in the ﬁnal year of the new incumbent's term, divided by total imports in the year
when elections took place. The sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination (origin)-product where (i)
PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the dependent variable for the triple is
positive over the new incumbent's term. When the region is comprised of a single country, product-country of destination
dummies are actually product dummies, and the regressions with country of destination dummies are redundant.
Table 2.A5: Bank Baseline Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total sample Spread 5%
P-value P-value
All PAN won PAN lost means diﬀ. PAN won PAN lost means diﬀ.
Saving Accounts 5403 4684 5563 0.55 4112 5022 0.52
(21289) (11519) (22898) (9184) (10194)
Branches 2.5 2.5 2.4 0.86 2.5 2.7 0.77
(6.4) (5.37) (6.59) (4.44) (4.68)
Number of employees 18.6 18.5 18.6 0.97 19.1 21.5 0.68
working in branches (57.75) (40.68) (60.9) (37.69) (43.45)
Demand deposits 136 129 138 0.79 144 150 0.89
(million Pesos) (485) (288) (519.24) (290) (276)
Time deposits 110 103 112 0.73 99 137 0.26
(million Pesos) (372) (240) (395) (192) (268)
Observations 1416 257 1159 87 111
Notes: Columns 1-3 report means for all municipalities in which elections occurred in 2007 and 2008. Columns 5-6 restrict
the sample to municipalities where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%. Columns 4 and 7 report p-values of
t-tests on the diﬀerence in means. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.A6: Bank Operations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2007 and 2008 elections Placebo: 2004 and 2005 elections
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005) OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Saving accounts
PAN win -735 -2,901 -3,442** -1,048** -2,450*** -2,585*** -230 -2,082 -2,064 -424 473 144
(1,067) (1,925) (1,705) (407.195) (774) (756) (1,365) (2,932) (3,141) (615.012) (1,192) (1,279)
Linear RD Polynomial No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank dummies No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250 197 197 197 197 197 197
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.014 0.03 0.40 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.001 0.00 0.38
Panel B: Branches
PAN win -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.0 -0.1** -0.1** -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1*** -0.1 -0.1
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1)
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.46
Panel C: Employees
PAN win -1.3 -3.8 -3.8 0.3 1.6 1.0 -1.9* -2.4 -2.6 -0.2 -2.9** -3.1**
(1.6) (3.2) (3.2) (1.3) (2.5) (2.6) (1.0) (1.8) (2.0) (0.8) (1.3) (1.5)
Observations 356 356 356 356 356 356 228 228 228 228 228 228
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.01 0.49
Panel D: Demand deposits (million Pesos)
PAN win -4.7 -57.8 -50.9 -0.3 -3.8 -2.2 -18.5 -10.0 -11.9 -28.0 54.5*** 44.3**
(19.6) (41.1) (39.4) (8.4) (11.7) (14.1) (13.6) (29.1) (29.2) (22.5) (18.4) (17.0)
Observations 317 317 317 317 317 317 226 226 226 226 226 226
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.05 0.41
Panel E: Time deposits (million Pesos)
PAN win 15.7 9.4 7.4 5.2 20.4 20.4 8.6 0.2 -0.9 5.6 -2.9 -2.8
(14.9) (22.9) (23.6) (15.8) (15.9) (16.9) (5.8) (7.7) (7.1) (3.8) (8.8) (9.3)
Observations 319 319 319 319 319 319 215 215 215 215 215 215
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.53
Notes: Columns 1-3 report standard OLS regressions; columns 4-6 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005.
The sample is comprised of municipality-bank level data where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections (after the
Drug War). Columns 7-9 report standard OLS regressions; columns 10-12 report weighted regressions. The sample is comprised of municipality-bank
level data where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2004 and 2005 elections (before the Drug War). Standard errors are clustered
at the municipality level.
Table 2.A7: Bank Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2007 and 2008 elections Placebo: 2004 and 2005 elections
OLS WLS (Pop. 2005) OLS WLS (Pop. 2005)
Panel A: Change in total credit (million Pesos)
PAN win -10.5 54.9* 45.3 1.9 7.5 11.6 -133.4 25.6 33.8 -12.4 -0.3 -3.9
(28.1) (30.6) (28.5) (6.4) (10.0) (11.7) (135.6) (38.4) (50.8) (9.9) (10.7) (11.8)
Linear RD Pol. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank dummies No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 733 733 733 733 733 733 592 592 592 592 592 592
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01
Panel B: Change in unsecured credit (million Pesos)
PAN win 11.2 23.4 25.9 1.6 -1.2 2.7 -499.0 120.8 190.4 -17.1 8.8 7.1
(7.3) (14.7) (16.4) (5.0) (8.5) (10.2) (501.5) (169.2) (247.6) (14.1) (10.8) (11.0)
Observations 559 559 559 559 559 559 357 357 357 357 357 357
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Change share of credit balance in default
PAN win -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08* -0.05 -0.07* -0.06 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04)
Observations 733 733 733 733 733 733 592 592 592 592 592 592
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.40
Notes: Columns 1-3 report standard OLS regressions; columns 4-6 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in
2005. In all panels, the dependent variable is the change in total credit. The sample is comprised of municipality-bank level data where PAN
won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections (after the Drug War). Columns 7-9 report standard OLS regressions;
columns 10-12 report weighted regressions. The sample is comprised of municipality-bank level data where PAN won or lost by a margin
smaller than 5% in the 2004 and 2005 elections (before the Drug War). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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3 A Managerial Explanation of Investment Sensitivity
to Cash: Evidence from European Football Tourna-
ments
Jesus Gorrin
3.1 Introduction
An important implication of the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem is that, under per-
fect capital markets, ﬁnancing decisions and therefore cash availability should not matter
for ﬁrm's investment decisions. To show whether it does matter and why is complicated.
Since Kaplan and Zingales (1997), it has been accepted that positive investment sensi-
tivities to cash can be explained by more than ﬁnancial constraints. Endogeneity is an
important concern when measuring investment sensitivity to cash. Cash is not random
and is potentially related to unobservables, such as investment opportunities.47
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to diminish endogeneity concerns when mea-
suring investment sensitivity to cash. To achieve this, I use a quasi-experimental setting
in which cash is as good as randomly assigned. Speciﬁcally, this setting is football teams
of the European Champions League that obtain awards in close matches.
Second, and more important, this paper provides a new explanationmanager's
experiencefor this positive sensitivity of investment to cash. In general, the litera-
ture focuses on growth opportunities and/or ﬁnancial constraints to explain this positive
sensitivity. However, managers have discretion to choose a ﬁrm's investment. Theoret-
ically their role is crucial, but, empirically, a ﬁrm's choice of manager is endogenous to
other unobservables, leading to bias. The setting use here provides a unique opportunity
to causally provide a link between investment to cash sensitivities and managerial charac-
teristics. Thirdly, this paper explores two diﬀerent theories than can explain investment
sensitivity to cash ﬂows: ﬁnancial constraints (caused by informational asymmetries) or
agency costs of free cash ﬂow.
Information asymmetries can make internal funding cheaper than outside funding
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). If prices for outside funding are too high, then positive net
present value (NPV) projects only can be ﬁnanced by internal funds. If internal funds
are not enough to ﬁnance good projects or are costly, the lack of investment leads to a
loss in potential economic value. Convincing evidence from the literature indicates that
cash constraints lead to underinvestment. For example, Paravisini (2008) uses a natural
experiment to provide evidence on credit-constrained banks, and De Mel, McKenzie,
and Woodruﬀ (2008) use random assignment to provide evidence of cash constraints in
47Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2005)
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micro-enterprises. On the other hand, for some ﬁrms, internal funds may be misused.
Misuse is related to the agency costs of free cash ﬂow proposed by Jensen (1986). Other
evidence also suggests that cash may be more valuable for well-governed ﬁrms (Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) and that ﬁrms may use excess cash to invest in less-desirable
projects (Lang, Stulz, and Walking, 1991). For some type of ﬁrms, cash may lead to a
problem of over-investment.
In both theories, one expects to observe a positive sensitivity of investment to cash
ﬂow. Nonetheless, the result of increasing investment by using cash should be the op-
posite in each theory. Because cash does not suﬀer from information asymmetries, one
expects to observe an improvement in performance for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms af-
ter a random cash windfall. If these ﬁrms were suﬀering from under investment then
we should observe investment in projects that improve the ﬁrm. We would observe the
opposite if ﬁrms were subject to agency costs of free cash ﬂow. This paper answers two
questions. Can managerial characteristics explain investment sensitivity to cash? And if
so, is this sensitivity consistent with over or under investment?
Explaining investment sensitivities to cash with ex-ante manager experience can be
consistent with both ﬁnancing constraints and free cash ﬂow problems. Inexperienced
managers could be a source of informational asymmetry, because there is more uncertainty
about their quality. Also, lack of experience can be related to the propensity of managers
to exhibit value destroying behavior. An important result of this paper is that investment
is only sensitive to cash if managers are inexperienced. Furthermore, new investments
made by a manager do not improve the team's performance ex-post. This result is more
likely to support the free cash ﬂow hypothesis.
This paper proposes one channel for positive investment sensitivity to cash ﬂows: con-
straints may be caused by managerial qualities. The next question is whether those ﬁrms
with inexperienced managers are better oﬀ after they receive extra cash. My evidence
points to a theory were investment constraints may be optimal for a ﬁrm with inexpe-
rienced managers because they prevent them from using cash for private beneﬁts rather
than to improve performance. This is consistent with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis.
In the spirit of Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), I use a quasi-
experimental setting that allows me to identify truly exogenous cash ﬂows. This, in
conjunction with information about managerial quality, helps me identify how invest-
ment responds to cash windfalls. To ﬁnd this causal link, this study uses European
football as its experimental setting. I gather data on European football player trades,
managers, and cash awards from international football competitions. Because total cash
in European international tournaments is related to team quality and managerial charac-
teristics, I use cash generated in close games an instrument. I provide evidence that cash
from close games is as good as randomly assigned and is uncorrelated with managers'
99
experience. For inexperienced managers, a ¿1 increase in cash translates into ¿1.1 spent
on new players during the winter market. When we account for the value of players sold,
the eﬀect is ¿0.68. The eﬀect on team performance in the local league after managers
spend the cash is close to zero. This investment also does not aﬀect the probability of
participating in more competitive programs in the next season. It also survives, and
becomes stronger when we use the sub-sample of teams that did not advance stage in the
tournament.
The European football industry provides an excellent experimental setting for testing
theories with diﬀerent empirical predictions on investment sensitivity to cash ﬂow, and
how managerial characteristics are linked to these predictions. First, players (or, more
speciﬁcally, player contracts) are frequently traded across teams. Furthermore, players
are the main input football clubs use to increase performance in the short term. Also,
for most cases, managers' experience and full working history is perfectly observable.
Moreover, we can consistently measure managers experience because jobs are within the
same industry. Second, many clubs participate in European competitions that give cash
awards based on performance. Many of the matches in these competitions are played
between very similar teams. Thus, some wins are as good as random, and they provide
an observable cash award. On the other hand, teams also play in the local league, which
serves as a measure of performance that is independent of the results in the European
competition. Third and ﬁnally, clubs can decide how to invest in players during very
speciﬁc windows. Therefore, we can observe a natural lag between cash and investment,
which reduces concerns on reverse causality.
To search for close matches, I construct a database with all the gambling odds for each
match in the Champions League from January 2003 until May 2014. Also, I gather data
on all the awards that have been given in the Champions League from 2003 until 2014 to
each participating team. Close games are identiﬁed by narrow diﬀerences in the ex-ante
odds. The lack of predictability of the odds in the neighborhood of a zero diﬀerence
between teams provides convincing evidence that results in close games are as good as
randomly assigned. My measure of random cash awards is the total amount of cash
obtained in close matches. I then use IV to estimate the sensitivity of investment in the
acquisition of new player contracts on total cash awards. Only teams with inexperienced
managers have a signiﬁcant positive sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow in the baseline
regression.
This paper provides a clean setting for causally identifying the eﬀect of cash on in-
vestment. However, more than a methodological contribution, this paper sheds new light
on the relation between investment sensitivities and managerial characteristics. It shows
that a lack of managerial experience may exacerbate investment sensitivity to cash ﬂow.
Interestingly, inexperienced managerial disbursements of cash do not translate into a
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signiﬁcant improvement in performance. So restricting the investment opportunities of
inexperienced managers may be a good idea for a ﬁrm, at least, until managers prove
their skill.
3.2 Background
European football is a sport followed and played by millions of people worldwide.
According to FIFA Big Count initiative, in 2006, the sport comprised around 65 million
registered male and female players. Furthermore, 327,008 clubs are registered with na-
tional federations aﬃliated to FIFA.48 Over the years, football has become more than
just a sport; it is an important industry. According to ﬁgures from transfermarkt.co.uk,
for 2014, the top-100 clubs had an estimated aggregate market value of ¿13.03 billion
sterling.49 They are managed by professionals who intervene in both the tactical decisions
of the game and the decisions to trade players.
The particularities of the tournaments and rules of the sport provide a good setting
for testing theories in ﬁnance and economics. For example, penalty kicks in football
provide a good experiment for testing game-theory predictions. Because penalty taking
can be observed as a zero-sum game with limited decision-making involved and only one
outcome, it was used to provide evidence in favor of agents following a min-max strategy
(Palacios-Huerta, 2003). Moreover, European football was used to estimate unintended
consequences of policy changes and to verify the role of non-monetary incentives. First,
by exploiting a change in rules, Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006) provide evidence
of how teams use destructive play to take advantage of new rules. This brings negative
consequences to the authorities in charge of the game by making the game less attractive
to the audience. On the other hand, evidence suggests referees systematically favor
home teams and succumb to crowd pressure (Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, and Prendergast,
2005).
Some authors in ﬁnance use European football results to measure the eﬀect of changes
in sentiment on ﬁnancial markets. For instance, Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007) ﬁnd
abnormal negative returns in the domestic stock market just after a national team has
been eliminated from the World Cup. Their results are robust and draw on evidence
about negative psychological factors aﬀecting investors. Also, there is evidence on how
initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) of football teams aﬀect their performance (Baur and McK-
eating, 2011) and on the eﬀect of team performance on their stock prices (Renneboog
and Vandrabant, 2000). However, to the best of my knowledge, no other paper has tried
to link the random nature of the prizes given in tournaments with managerial decisions.
I use the particularities of football tournaments and the industry in general to test
48FIFA Big Count Initiative. 2007. FIFA Communications Division. Information Services.
49Football Market Values. Retrieved from [transfermarkt.co.uk]
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for theories about sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow. Examining the football industry
can give us reliable estimates of the sensitivity of investment to cash for multiple reasons.
First, clubs have a standardized and well-regulated market, where players are traded.
Players are allowed to play for one club at a time. They can only change clubs at the end
of their contract or if the contract is bought or borrowed by another team and accepted
by the player. Trades only occur during speciﬁc windows. So even if teams secure cash
after playing at diﬀerent dates, all of them spend their money during almost the same
windows in Europe. Even when there are diﬀerences between windows (most of them only
diﬀer in hours, if at all), trade with countries in which windows are closed is not possible.
This diminishes concerns that investment in player contracts is driven by timing, rather
than actual cash awards.
Second, there is a monetary market for odds in football. The institutional bookmakers
in these markets act like market aggregators. They make proﬁts by overestimating the
odds of each event and, therefore, paying less than what the market-implied probability
would require for breaking even. So the implied odds should aggregate market informa-
tion. These implied probabilities can be used to predict the expected cash ﬂows a team
should receive from awards. Deviations from these expectations can be interpreted as
random. This is the main source of exogeneiy in this paper.
Third, there is public information about the awards teams received in tournaments,
the performance of the teams, the players traded, and the managers in charge of each
team. Diﬀerent from other industries, it is easier to measure managerial experience
because managerial changes are publicly observable for all relevant professional teams.
Therefore, I can follow the career of any particular manager over time. Furthermore, it is
easier to measure experience, since manager careers are always in the same industry. This
gives a good setting in which to test some of the most important relationships between
management qualities and the standard predictions of either ﬁnancial constraints or the
free cash ﬂow hypothesis.
3.3 Data
I compile three data sets for clubs that participated in the UEFA Champions League
from 2003 until 2014.
3.3.1 Betting odds data for each game of the UEFA Champions League
I gather historical betting odds data from oddsportal.com for each game of the UEFA
Champions League from January 2003 until May 2014. This web page provides data on
the average betting odds oﬀered by online betting companies, including, when available,
the most popular ones, such as bwin, ladbrokes, and bet-at-home. The median number of
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bookmakers is 5, but, depending on the popularity of the game, it can range from 1 to 15
bookmakers. Bookmakers assume initial odds. Then each bookmaker updates the odds
from observing demands for each result. To close the books, bookmakers adjust the odds
such that they add to more than one. This way a gambler that takes all positions loses
money, and the bookmaker makes money.50 Therefore, because odds aggregate public
information with real money at stake, one can reasonably assume they reveal market
expectations about match results.
I focus on three potential outcomes: a win, a tie, or a loss.51 Based on the odds, I
estimate the implied probability for each event by dividing the odd of each event by the
sum of the odds of the three possible events. Table 3.1 summarizes the statistics of odds
for a home team win, tie, or loss. As we can see, home teams have better odds of winning
before the match. Tying is the less likely event. Moreover, the probabilities signiﬁcantly
diﬀer game by game.
3.3.2 Player transfer data by teams
Player transfer data were collected for all the 247 teams that participated at least in
the Champions League initial stage at any point from January 2003 until May 2014 from
transfermarkt.co.uk. This source has been used in other settings (Bryson, Frick, and
Simmons, 2013). This web page collects the numbers of player transfers and their prices
by each team per season. Nonetheless, because some transfer prices are never revealed,
attrition may be a concern. However, for important transfers, Transfermarkt provides
an estimate based on the news. The sample of teams treated by the instrument is larger
than the average. So attrition bias is not likely to be a major problem.
Player contracts give teams the exclusive right to use a player in competition, although
this right can be traded with other teams. Player transfers happen during two windows:
a winter window, which occurs in the middle of the season, and a summer window, which
occurs after the season ends. Even after a trade, a player can only play for one team in
a particular season in the UEFA Champions League. However, they can play for several
teams in the domestic league during the same season. So players bought during the
winter transfer can only improve performance in the domestic league. Unfortunately,
Transfermarkt data do not separate the trades by the speciﬁc windows. Therefore, I
collect trade-by-trade information to determine in which window a player was traded. To
minimize the data-gathering process, for winter transfers, I only collect data for teams
that face close matches.52 Because some teams go bankrupt or do not have available data
50On very rare occasions, the initial odds are set up in a way that the adjustments would still leave
arbitrage opportunities. In my sample, this only happens in 14 of 2,126 matches.
51Gamblers could bet in other more complex events. However, the awards given to a team per match
would depend on whether the team wins, ties, or loses.
52A close match in this setting is deﬁned as one in which for each team the probability of losing minus
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for earlier years, the panel is unbalanced. I am able to identify most transfer information
from 2003 until 2014 for all the teams that advanced beyond the qualiﬁcation stage of
the Champions League at least once. Table 3.2 summarizes the relevant trade statistics
by team.
According to the data, most teams do not buy or sell player contracts at a fee. There
are two reasons for this. First, teams hire players from their academies or when they
are already out of contract for no extra fee. Second, attrition may be strong, especially
for small teams. If the main reason is attrition, it could lead to a bias. However, for
small teams, the awards are relatively larger in size and therefore should aﬀect managers
investment decisions more. If small teams are also more likely to have less-experienced
managers would bias my results downward. i.e., attrition would undermine the possibility
of ﬁnding investment to cash sensitivity for less experienced managers.
On another matter, teams that face a close match tend to trade more actively. In a
model with heterogeneous treatment eﬀects, which are reasonable in this setting, I would
ﬁnd only the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE). Therefore, it is important to keep in
mind that, in this setting, the set of compliers is likely to cover a sample of teams that is
bigger and more active than the average.
3.3.3 Money awards from UEFA Champions League
The UEFA Champions League awards ﬁxed amounts in each stage, performance-
based bonuses in the group stage, and a variable amount that depends on the value of
the TV licenses of each team. Moreover, each match provides a performance-contingent
payment.
Only cash generated until the group stage is available for the winter transfer mar-
ket. For the purpose of this paper, the winter transfer market is more important for
three reasons. First, players acquired in this market can be used in the domestic league
immediately. Second, the window for planning is smaller in the middle of the season,
so managerial discretion is a more pressing issue. Third, winter transfers diminish the
likelihood of a managerial change before player transfers occur. Hence, I focus on awards
obtained during the group stage.
UEFA's ﬁnancial statements provide data on the awards for each team. Until the
2005/2006 season, awards were paid in Swiss Francs. Since the 2006/2007 season, they
have been paid in Euros. Because the team trade data are denominated in pounds
sterling, data on awards are converted to pounds, using the average exchange rate over
the year (see the appendix for the data on sterling-denominated awards).
the probability of winning is less than 5% in absolute value.
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3.3.4 Manager data
I also collected manager's data from transfermarkt.co.uk. Managers experience is
measured as the diﬀerence between the managers ﬁrst professional appointment and the
beginning of the football season.53 Table 3.3 shows the average experience of a manager
is 13 years. Managers are on average 50 years old and typically manage the same team
for 2 years. The median tenure is below the mean and, under further inspection, shows
positive skewness. Therefore, managers that spend more time than the median are likely
to remain with the same club for a long time.
3.4 Empirical Setting
As a symptom of ﬁnancial constraints, I am interested in the eﬀect of cash on in-
vestment. If a ﬁrm is unconstrained, cash should not aﬀect investment decisions. This
study also seeks to test whether credit constraints change with managerial experience.
The model is as follows:
Investmentit = α + ρCashit + xitβ + εit.
ρ is the coeﬃcient of interest. Total cash refers to awards obtained before the relevant
transfer window. Two measures of investment in new players are used. First, gross
investment is measured as the total amount spent on new player contracts during the
winter transfer window; second, net investment is measured as the diﬀerence between the
total expenditure on new player contracts and the income from contracts sold during the
winter window.xit represents potentially unobservable characteristics that are correlated
to cash.
A simple regression of investment on cash is likely to suﬀer from endogeneity. First,
unobservables that aﬀect investment may be also correlated with cash. Some examples
are the quality of clubs' youth academies, manager quality, and the popularity of the
team. Unobservables cause omitted variable bias in a standard ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression. Second, both cash and investment are determined in the same economic
model, so there may be a problem of simultaneity. Common shocks to cash and investment
may lead to spurious correlation. Also, if a team anticipates certain cash ﬂows, then it
can plan its future investments. This leads to a reverse causality problem.
The ideal experiment would consist of randomly allocating cash to teams with diﬀerent
types of managers. This study is a close approximate of the ideal experiment. I ﬁnd a
source of exogenous variation that aﬀects investment only through cash ﬂows, and I use it
as my instrument. This instrument is cash generated in close matches at the group stage
53I only consider appointments of full managers at the professional level. I do not consider appoint-
ments in smaller roles like coaches or scouts.
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of the European Champions League. This section demonstrates that the instrumental
variable (IV) estimation captures the LATE of cash on investment.
Ex-ante odds are used to determine close games, which are deﬁned as those in which
the diﬀerence between the probability of winning and the probability of losing is less than
0.05 in absolute value. Maximum uncertainty about the outcome exists for these matches.
Thus, any cash ﬂow generated under these circumstances is as good as randomly assigned.
In theory, odds have predictive power. As the home team's probability of winning
increases in relation to the other team, we should observe a higher proportion of actual
wins. We observe this pattern, except around a diﬀerence of zero. Figure 1 illustrates how
the actual predictability of odds become ﬂatter around the point at which the diﬀerence
in probability of the home team winning or losing is zero.
The second evidence of randomness in close matches is even more powerful. The
team with the highest probability of winning is deﬁned as the favorite. If probabilities
are indicative of the likelihood of a team winning, then, on average, the proportion of
games the favorite wins should be signiﬁcantly higher than its ties or losses. I show this
is true for the unrestricted sample of games. However, when I restrict the sample so
that both teams have an almost equal probability of winning, diﬀerences between the
proportions disappear. In other words, the three outcomes are equally likely.
To test whether results are random, I ﬁrst look at the favorites before an speciﬁc
match. I then look at whether the favorite won, tied, or lost. In Table 3.4, I show the
proportion of each result that is realized. In the unconditional sample, the proportion
of times the favorite wins is higher than the number of ties and so on. However, the
sample of close games generates realizations that are indistinguishable from one-third.
That means results in close matches are evenly split.
In Table 3.5, I test how signiﬁcant the diﬀerences between proportions are, using a
one-tailed test under the hypothesis that the better outcome is more likely for the favorite
team. For the full sample, the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level for the favorite
winning versus tying, for the favorite winning versus losing, and for the favorite tying
versus losing. However, if the sample is restricted to close games, there are no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the proportions of any two results (see Table 3.5).
I also apply a chi-squared test under the null hypothesis that match outcomes from a
discrete uniform distribution, where each event is equally likely. If all events are equally
likely, then there is maximum uncertainty. As expected, for the unrestricted sample, we
cannot accept the null hypothesis that the distribution is a discrete uniform distribution
with equal probabilities of each event. On the contrary, for the sample of close matches,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the outcome behaves as a draw from a discrete
uniform distribution.54 As a consequence, any result from a close game can be interpreted
54The results are summarised in the Appendix Table 3.12
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as random because any event is equally likely.
A potential criticism of my instrument is that more total cash awards in close games
can mask better performance at the team level. Therefore, total cash awards would be
correlated with unobservable drivers of quality. This would make my instrument not
random, and, therefore invalid. I cannot show explicitly this is not the case, but I can
provide indicative evidence in favor of my assumption that cash awards from close games
are indeed random. If we believe that close wins are correlated with quality, we should
observe persistently better performance for winners and worse performance for losers.
However, no team wins more than one close match in a season. Moreover, out of my
sample of 183 teams facing close matches, only 6 experience more than one close loss in
a particular season. The results are robust to the exclusion of these teams.
Additionally, I forecast future random awards based on past team observable char-
acteristics. We can see in the Appendix (Table 3.13) that the main variables of interest
related to team past performance, managerial experience, and player contract trades do
not signiﬁcantly explain cash awards in close games.
If we assume the treatment is randomly assigned, then there are still requirements for
the exclusion restriction to be satisﬁed. The treatment aﬀects investment only through
a change in cash. This assumption is stronger. Some potential violations include if
winning one particular close match changes the values of player contracts, alters the
public perceptions of a team, alters the teams business model, or changes the manager.
In any of these cases, the instrument would not be valid.55
The exclusion restriction is the most problematic assumption in my setting. However,
it is likely that it is still satisﬁed for a few reasons. First, the cash awards are not large
enough to change the whole structure of the team. Second, a good result in one game
in the group stage does not guarantee that a team will advance in the tournament. It
is also unlikely to trigger a managerial change. In the data, a close match win does not
change the probability of a manager staying or leaving a team. Random close wins are
also unlikely to change the values of player contracts because a small sample of particular
matches are not enough to accurately assess player qualities. Players potentially play
more than 50 games per season. Teams in this sample are exposed to four close matches,
at most, in the group stage.
Even if a team advances rounds just after winning a close match, players acquired in
the winter window can be used in the domestic league, but not in the Champions League.
Furthermore, the tournaments in which a team plays are pre-determined at the beginning
of the season, so it is unlikely that cash obtained in close matches brings new investment
opportunities.
Another variation of the previous critique of my instrument is the following: there
55The reduced-form result would still have a causal interpretation though.
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could be complementarities between the winning of close matches and more matches
available in the season. This would mean that managers may be forced to acquire new
players to keep performance at the same level. Therefore, no signiﬁcant change in per-
formance would not imply that managers are spending resources on unnecessary player
contracts. For example, a team that has to play more games as a consequence of winning
close matches might need to acquire players just to maintain its performance. Although
this is a valid concern, I provide evidence that this is not the main driver of the results
of this paper. To test this I exploit an extra source of variation, by using a sample of
"unlucky winners". These are teams that obtain more money in close matches in the
groups, but do not advance the stage. The results are even stronger in this sample.
To satisfy the LATE theorem, monotonicity is needed in the treatment. In this setting
monotonicity is trivially satisﬁed because, ceteris paribus, winning a close match increases
the total cash the team makes in the tournament.
Finally, a ﬁrst stage is needed for a valid instrumental variable estimation. A strong
ﬁrst stage exists, and the signs are as expected. Because the ﬁrst stage is also an inter-
esting result in and of itself, it is further discussed in the next section.
3.5 Results
As discussed by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), a weak instrument leads to bias in
the IV estimation. Also, to avoid bias from multiple instruments, my model is exactly
identiﬁed. The requirements in the ﬁrst stage are stronger than those in the simple t-
statistic tests. I ﬁrst show that cash obtained from random awards is a strong positive
predictor of the total cash obtained by a team in the group stage. As evident in Table 3.6,
¿1 million from close games translates into ¿2.8 million in total awards. This number is
big, because the position within a group also aﬀects the total cash paid by the tournament
organizers. Thus, winning a close match also generates a higher total group payment at
the end. To test the strength of the instrument, I verify the F-statistic of the regression
on the excluded instrument, that is, the random awards. It is well above the F = 10
threshold that Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) suggest.
I divide the sample into two groups by managerial experience. If the manager has
less experience than the median manager in the whole sample, that manager is deﬁned
as inexperienced. Otherwise, a manager is deﬁned as experienced. Importantly, the
correlation between actual manager experience and random awards is 0.018. Therefore,
the instrument is not correlated with the way the sample is broken down. As seen in
Table 3.7, the ﬁrst-stage results of close games on total awards are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar in both sub-samples.
Like in most papers that rely on estimations around a suﬃciently small window,
the number of observations is limited. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to estimate precisely
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the eﬀect of cash on investment. Table 3.7 shows that, although the sign is positive
and the number is statistically meaningful, the eﬀect of cash on new player acquisitions
is not signiﬁcant in the unrestricted sample. However, when I separate the teams by
the manager's experience, I ﬁnd that inexperienced managers signiﬁcantly increase their
expenditures in the winter market. The experienced ones do not. For inexperienced
managers, one extra pound of cash translates into an increase of ¿1.1 used to acquire
new players.
For net player contract investments, the results are qualitatively similar. Table 3.8
shows that for every pound inexperienced managers obtain in cash, they increase their
net expenditure in player acquisitions by ¿0.61. Although this result is not statistically
signiﬁcant, it is economically meaningful. For experienced managers, the net investment
is close to zero.
My next question is whether these new player acquisitions translate into better per-
formance for the team. My measure for performance is the average points earned in
the local league, which is independent of the performance in the Champion's League.
Furthermore, new players can be used in the domestic league regardless of whether they
played for other teams in the Champion's League. A regression of cash on average points
in the league is diﬃcult to interpret. Therefore, all variables are standardized, so as to
interpret the coeﬃcients in terms of standard deviations. No evidence of an improvement
in performance is found. As reported in Table 3.9, when a regression of random awards
on points per game is run, is the sign is indistinguishable from zero, even though it is
positive for inexperienced managers. Thus, it seems that new players are not improving
the overall performance of the team.
There is a potential criticism of my identiﬁcation. If close match wins signiﬁcantly
change team investment opportunities diﬀerently for each type of manager, the result
may be driven by complementarities between previous close wins and the necessity to
acquire new players to keep performance at the same level.
I restrict to a sample of unlucky winners. These are teams that won random cash
awards, but that failed to clear the stage and pass to the next round. This regression has
less power because the database decreases substantially. Nonetheless, the main results
persist. As we can see in Table 3.10 when we restrict the sample to teams that did not
proceed stage, we observe a signiﬁcant investment sensitivity to cash ﬂow overall. The
magnitude is larger for teams with inexperienced managers; although not signiﬁcant.
This lack of signiﬁcance is inﬂuenced by an increase in standard errors and an important
decrease in the sample size. In terms of the point estimates, the results are robust in
this subsample. Therefore, it is unlikely that results are driven by the fact that certain
managers get better opportunities after winning a close match.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this paper I have identiﬁed a causal relationship between investment and cash.
I relate this investment sensitivity to managerial quality, showing that inexperienced
managers signiﬁcantly increase the amount of money spent on player contracts after
football teams receive unanticipated cash ﬂows. Therefore, it seems that investment
sensitivity to cash can be linked to managerial quality. For inexperienced managers, a ¿1
increase in cash translates into a ¿1.1 increase in gross investment in new players and a
¿0.61 increase in net investment in new players.
Another important contribution of this paper concerns how I identify the relationship
between cash and investment. I use a quasi-experimental setting in European football
by exploiting two important features of the sport. First, players are traded publicly
in the market within well-deﬁned transfer windows. Second, when teams participate
in international competitions, they are awarded money based on the results of a single
match. Betting market information is used to calculate the implicit odds of each result
and show that close matches are unpredictable. The money obtained in these close
matches is used as an instrument for the total cash award. I then separate teams by their
managers experience, which appears to be uncorrelated with the results from the close
matches. This setting allows me to test whether managerial quality is related to ﬁnancial
constraints. Indeed, it is.
Surprisingly, an increase in player acquisition does not improve a teams overall perfor-
mance. My interpretation is that managers use cash ﬂows to increase their own beneﬁts
in a way that is not necessarily optimal for the team.
These results suggest that hiring inexperienced managers may exacerbate ﬁnancial
constraints. Nonetheless, these constraints may arise because of potential agency con-
ﬂicts. Manager inexperience can be related to information asymmetries or to agency cost
of free cash ﬂow. My results show that performance does not improve after the investment
is done. Suggesting that agency cost of free cash ﬂow are a more likely explanation.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Statistical Summary of Odds Data
Win at Home Tie at Home Lose at Home
Mean 0.4770 0.2434 0.2796
SD 0.2076 0.0554 0.1793
Median 0.4724 0.2617 0.2440
Note: This table summarizes the implied odds of all games played in the Champions League from season 2002/2003 until
2013/2014.
Table 3.2: Statistical Summary of Player Transfers Data
All Teams Teams Exposed to Close Matches
Selling Buying Selling Buying Winter Sales Winter Buys
Mean ¿5.06 ¿6.41 ¿24.13 ¿16.82 ¿2.65 ¿4.41
SD ¿11.56 ¿16.71 ¿16.72 ¿18.72 ¿0.48 ¿9.96
Median ¿0.308 ¿0.1625 ¿15.93 ¿10.3 ¿5.16 ¿0.83
Notes: This table summarizes the value of players sold and bought by football teams. Winter refers to the player trading
window that occurs in the middle of the season. Teams exposed to close matches are those with at least one match in the
Champions League during the group stage in which the diﬀerence between their ex-ante probability of winning versus the
probability of losing is less than 5% in absolute value.
Table 3.3: Statistical Summary of Manager Characteristics
Experience (yr) Age (yr) Tenure (yr)
Mean 13 49.6 2
SD 8.6 7.9 3.4
Median 11.7 49 1.13
Notes: This table summarizes manager characteristics. Experience is deﬁned as the years from the managers ﬁrst appoint-
ment by a professional team until the beginning of the relevant season. Tenure is deﬁned as the years that a manager has
been managing a team at the beginning of the relevant season.
Table 3.4: Proportion of times each result is observed given the odds
Favorite Wins Favorite Ties Favorite Loses
Full Sample 0.5974 0.2253 0.1773
Close Games (Less 5% Diﬀ. in Odds) 0.3387 0.3065 0.3548
Notes: This table summarizes the proportion of times the favorite (the team with the highest probability of winning) gets
each of the three possible realizations: a win, a tie, or a loss.
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Table 3.5: p-Values of One-Sided t-Test of Proportion Diﬀerences
Wins versus Tie Tie versus Lose Win versus Lose
Full Sample 2.02×10−87*** 1.69×10−87*** 1.68×10−87***
Close Games (Less than a 5% Diﬀ. in Odds) 0.2920 0.2910 0.1677
Note: This table summarizes the results from a one-tailed hypothesis test assuming better results are more likely for the
favorite team.
Table 3.6: First-Stage results
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
Cashit Cashit Cashit
RandomAwardsit 2.76***
(0.51)
2.95***
(0.60)
2.57***
(0.72)
Observations 143 71 72
R2 0.17 0.19 0.14
F 29.57 23.92 13.08
# Teams 64 44 43
Notes: Cashit is the total cash generated by a team in the UEFA Champions League until the winter break. After the
winter break, the relevant player transfer market opens. RandomAwardsit is the cash generated by a team during a close
match in the group stage.
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Table 3.7: Money Spent on New Football Player Acquisitions
Panel A: Reduced-Form Regressions
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
WinterBuysit WinterBuysit WinterBuysit
Cashit 0.50
(4.24)
3.25*
(1.81)
-1.89
(4.1)
Observations 143 71 72
R2 0.0003 0.0279 0.0028
F 0.05 3.22 0.21
# Teams 64 44 43
Panel B: Final Regressions
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
WinterBuysit WinterBuysit WinterBuysit
RandomAwardsit 0.18
(0.77)
1.1*
(0.61)
-0.74
(1.64)
Observations 143 71 72
R2 0.0164 0.19 0.14
# Teams 64 44 43
Notes: Cashit is the total cash generated by a team in the UEFA Champions League until the winter break. After the
winter break, the relevant player transfer market opens. RandomAwardsit is the cash generated by a team during a close
match in the group stage. WinterBuysit is the amount spend on acquiring new players in the winter transfer window.
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Table 3.8: Net Money Spent on Football Players
Panel A: Reduced-Form Regressions
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
WinterNetit WinterNetit WinterNetit
Cashit 0.70
(2.5)
1.78
(2.69)
-0.17
(4.14)
Observations 143 71 72
R2 0.0005 0.0058 0.0000
F 0.08 0.08 0.00
# Teams 64 44 43
Panel B: Final Regressions
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
WinterNetit WinterNetit WinterNetit
RandomAwardsit 0.25
(0.90)
0.60
(0.91)
-0.07
(1.58)
Observations 143 71 72
R2 0.0081 .
# Teams 64 44 43
Notes: Cashit is the total cash generated by a team in the UEFA Champions League until the winter break. After the
winter break, the relevant player transfer market opens. RandomAwardsit is the cash generated by a team during a close
match in the group stage. WinterNetit is the amount spend on acquiring new players minus the amount obtained from
selling players in the winter transfer window.
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Table 3.9: Points per Match on Random Awards (Standardized Regression)
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
Performanceit Performanceit Performanceit
RandomAwardsit -0.004
(0.068)
0.03
(0.1)
-0.04
(0.09)
Observations 147 72 75
R2 0.0000 0.0015 0.0022
F 0.00 0.10 0.16
# Teams 64 44 44
Notes: Performanceit is measured as the points per match obtained by a team in a domestic competition.
RandomAwardsit is the cash generated by a team during a close match in the group stage. To improve the intuition, I
standardize all variables by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. This allows me to interpret the
results in relation to the standard deviation.
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Table 3.10: Sensitivity of Investment to Cash "Unlucky Winners"
Panel A: IV Regressions Winter Buys
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
WinterBuyit WinterBuyit WinterBuyit
Cashit 2.88**
(1.35)
4.4
(6.17)
2.61***
(0.89)
Observations 68 28 39
Wald 4.53 0.51 8.68
# Teams 43 23 28
Panel B: IV Regressions Winter Net Investments
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
WinterNetit WinterNetit WinterNetit
RandomAwardsit 3.13*
(1.73)
4.23
(6.89)
3.04**
(1.28)
Observations 68 28 39
Wald 3.31 0.38 5.64
# Teams 43 23 28
Instrument Random
Awards
Notes: Cashit is the total cash generated by a team in the UEFA Champions League until the winter break. After the
winter break, the relevant player transfer market opens. RandomAwardsit is the cash generated by a team during a close
match in the group stage. WinterNetit is the amount spent on acquiring new players minus the amount obtained from
selling players in the winter transfer window. WinterBuysit is the amount spent on acquiring new players during the
winter transfer window (just after the award is received).
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.10: Home Wins as a Proportion of Games in which a Team Won
Notes : In this graph only games in which there was a winner (no ties) are considered.
The y-axis shows the proportion of wins by the home team divided by games with no
ties. The x -axis shows the diﬀerence between the ex-ante odds of the home team winning
minus the ex-ante odds of the home team losing. Around zero, predictability becomes
low.
Appendix
Explanation of International European football tournaments
The format of European football tournaments from 2003 until 2014 has consisted of
two games against each rival: one at home and one away. To enter the competition,
each team must ﬁnish in the top places of the domestic league or cup. Not all
leagues get a direct spot for their best teams. Depending on the performance of
previous teams, each domestic league is directly assigned spots (i.e., qualiﬁcation
is not required), and/or indirect spots. Teams that enter the indirect spots need
to undertake qualiﬁcation rounds against teams from other leagues in the same
situation. Teams knockout each other in one to one series until all available spots
(32 teams) are ﬁlled. To qualify, a team must get a better aggregate goal average
(i.e., goals scored minus goals received) in both games; in the case of a tie in the
goal average, then the team that scores more goals away advances, and, if there is
still a tie, one team must win in extra time or in penalty kicks.
After qualiﬁcation, the teams enter a group stage in which the best two teams
advance to the next round. The best two teams are deﬁned as those with the most
points in a group. A win is worth 3 points, a tie is worth 1 point, and a loss is
worth 0 points. In the case of a tie in points, the following criteria are applied to
determine which team advances:
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(a) The team with the best goal average (diﬀerence between goals scored and
goals received) among teams that gathered the same number of points in their
group matches. If this criterion does not generate a tie break move to the next
criterion.
(b) Among teams with the same number of points and goal average, the team with
the most goals scored advances. If this criterion does not generate a tie break
move to the next criterion.
(c) Among teams wuth the same number of points, goal average and goals scored,
the team with the most goals scored away (in rival stadiums) advances. If this
criterion does not generate a tie break move to the next criterion.
(d) Repeat the previous steps for statistics against all the teams (instead of teams
with the same number of points) in the group.
The following rounds have the same rules as the qualiﬁcation stage, and they con-
tinue until only one team prevails. In the round of 16, teams are randomly matched
conditional on having always a best of a group with a second best. From there,
the best team after the two matches advances. The last two surviving teams play
a single match for the ﬁnal.
UEFA Champions League average awards over the sample
Table 3.11: Statistical Summary of Awards Data
Awards (Millions GBP)
Fixed Amounts Groups 5.4
Wins in Groups 0.57
Ties in Groups 0.28
Round 16 2.18
Quarter-ﬁnalist 2.46
Semi-ﬁnalist 3.08
Runner-up 4.18
Champion 6.96
Note: This table summarizes the awards in the Champions League from season 2002/2003 until 2013/2014.
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Table 3.12: p-Value of Chi-Squared Test
Full Sample 3.81×10−147***
Close Games (Less than a 5% Diﬀ. in Odds) 0.7127
Note: This table tests the hypothesis of whether the proportion of observed results is the same as a discrete uniform
distribution in which each event is equally likely.
Table 3.13: Forecasting Random Awards using Observables
All Teams Teams with
Inexperienced
Managers
Teams with
Experienced
Managers
RandomAwardsit
ManagerExperienceit 0.001
(0.003)
0.01
(0.01)
0.002
(0.008)
Pointsit−1 -0.11
(0.09)
-0.15
(0.15)
-0.07
(0.14)
Buysit−1 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
Sellsit−1 0.002
(0.002)
0.0005
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
Observations 141 70 71
R2 0.04 0.05 0.05
F 1.98 0.85 1.98
# Teams 63 43 43
Notes: RandomAwardsit is the cash generated by a team during a close match in the group stage. ManagerExperienceit
is the number of years since a managers ﬁrst professional appointment and the beginning of the current season. Pointsit−1
is the points per game in the domestic league in the previous season (a measure of performance). Buysit− 1 is the money
spent in the acquisition of player contracts in the previous season. Sellsit− 1 is the money obtained from the sale of player
contracts in the previous season.
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